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FOREWORD
It is obvious that U.S.-Russian relations and EastWest relations more broadly have recently deteriorated.
Yet analyses of why this is the case have often been
confined to American policy. The author of this
monograph, Dr. Stephen Blank, seeks to analyze some
of the key strategic issues at stake in this relationship
and trace that decline to Russian factors which have
been overlooked or neglected. At the same time, he has
devoted considerable time to recording some of the
shortcomings of U.S. policy and recommending a way
out of the growing impasse confronting both sides.
This analysis, originally presented at the annual
Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) strategy conference of
2007, was part of a panel that engaged the strategic
challenges confronting the United States from Russia.
As such, it was part of the conference’s larger theme of
analyzing regional strategic challenges to U.S. interests
and policy across the globe. As the conference pointed
out, these challenges are many, diverse, and growing
in number, if not intensity. Therefore the need for
informed and critical discussion of the issues raised
by these challenges, a constant mission of SSI, is ever
more necessary. We offer this monograph to help meet
that need for our readers.

		
DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
East-West relations have noticeably deteriorated,
and Russia’s behavior has become commensurately
more self-assertive. Key arms control achievements are
in jeopardy, and Russia claims to be facing an array of
growing threats, most prominently from America. In
fact, Russia demands more respect from and equality
with Washington and a free hand in world politics. In
key respects, Moscow’s new foreign policy grows out
of the logic of its ever more autocratic and neo-imperial
political structure. As analyzed in the monograph, this
structure reinforces the long-standing Russian tendency
to view other states as being inherently adversarial,
i.e., it has a disposition to see world politics in terms
of a presupposition of a priori enemies. Thus it views
arms control issues from the standpoint of deterring
enemies not working with strategic partners.
The danger of a foreign policy that relies on truculent
rhetoric, inflated and aggressive threat assessments,
and an autocratic and neo-imperial political structure
based on the ideology of Russia’s desire for a free hand
in world politics and ingrained belief that others are
inherently the same is that it will stimulate precisely
the adversarial behavior in Washington that it claims
to see. There are already growing signs that certain
sectors of the policymaking community are increasingly
inclined to view Russia as a question mark, if not a
rival of American policy. This is particularly the case
regarding issues of arms control and nuclear policy.
Thus the current rhetorical belligerence seen in Russian
policy and the increasing amount of interest in higher
defense spending and inflated threat assessments
could bring about exactly what Russian elites already
claim to observe.
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Accordingly, it is necessary for the United States to
understand the scope of the challenge posed by Russia
and to take steps towards reformulating its policies so
that they are more coherent and unified, more deeply
engaged with Russia across a wide spectrum of issues,
and also more coordinated with our European allies.
This means that we must forego the idea that good
relations between presidents suffice, or that we have
no leverage on Russia, or that human rights should not
be a major part of our concern. While Russian interests
and concerns must be engaged with seriousness and
respect, they cannot be allowed to overshadow our
own interests and concerns. The need for permanent
ongoing bureaucratic engagement with Russia remains
a challenge for Washington, but it is one that can and
must be met by means of a long-term strategically
conceived policy. And that policy must engage Moscow
across all the issues of topical concern to Washington.
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TOWARDS A NEW RUSSIA POLICY
INTRODUCTION: THE ADVERSARIAL EASTWEST RELATIONSHIP
Today speculation about a new cold war or arms
race between Moscow and Washington is rampant,
easy to come by, and even permeates official discourse.
Indeed, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov
characterized Russo-American relations as “alarming”
in June 2007.1 Similarly, at least some senior officials
in the Bush administration now believe that, far from
merely craving respect (although that certainly is the
case), Russia has provided “overwhelming evidence”
that it seeks to weaken America. Thus “wherever
possible internationally,” they say, “Moscow will work
to stop America from achieving success.”2 And at the
same time North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Sheffer is calling on
Moscow to clarify its views on ties with NATO, and
there are moves afoot in both Moscow and Washington
to restrict foreign investment in their economies by
tightening national security reviews of such proposed
investments.3
Although Lavrov and Deputy Prime Minister (and
former Defense Minister) Sergei Ivanov both explicitly
rule out “Cold War” as a label for Russo-American
relations, their subordinates are not so soothing.4
Thus Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr’ Losyukov,
speaking in Tehran, said that Washington was using
Korea and Iran’s prolfieration as an issue to consolidate
its global strategic position, i.e., invoking those two
states to justify its missile defense program. If this issue
cannot be resolved by diplomatic means, he warned,
Russia will carry out a series of military acts to balance
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and establish security. And this could prompt an arms
race.5 This frosty warning, rather than the calculated,
insincere, and misleading efforts to invoke RussoAmerican partnership, more accurately characterizes
the present state of Russo-American relations even if
they are far from the Cold War.
Recent Russian actions include two overflights of
Great Britain, Finland, and Norway; flights to Guam of
Tu-95s; the resumption of armed aerial patrols; repeated
overflights and bombings of Georgia; suspension of
compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE) Treaty; threats to renounce the Intermediate
nuclear Forces in Europe (INF) Treaty; threats to target
the Czech Republic and Poland if missile defense
installations are placed there; announcement of plans to
refurbish the Navy’s Mediterranean squadron; calls for
a gas cartel; continuing regression towards ever more
authoritarian political practices; arms sales to Iran and
Syria, and recognition of Hamas; and the launching of
an information war attack against Estonia for removing
a Soviet war monument in Tallinn. All these imply the
consolidation of a fundamentally adversarial position
towards the West, not just the United States.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s speeches to the
Munich Wehrkunde Conference in February 2007 and
to the Russian Federal Assembly in April highlighted
this trend and outlined many of Russia’s grievances
against the West and Washington in particular.6
Subsequently in his V-E day speech on May 9, 2007, he
explicitly compared the United States to Nazi Germany.7
In the speech to the Federal Assembly, he confirmed
that adversarial quality of bilateral relations when
he announced the suspension of Russia’s compliance
with the CFE Treaty.8 Indeed, Russian Chief of Staff
General Yuri N. Baluyevsky subsequently warned that
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this treaty is on the verge of collapse.9 Since that treaty
has no provisions for a moratorium, Baluyevsky’s
warning probably presages Russia’s withdrawal from
the CFE treaty.10 Thus Putin’s decree of July 14, 2007,
suspending Russian participation in the treaty, should
not have surprised us, although apparently it did
surprise some in Washington.11
We and the West as a whole were clearly surprised
as well by Putin’s speech at Munich and by many
other recent Russian policies. This complacency
and unpreparedness is unwarranted as Russian
unhappiness with U.S. policy has been growing since
2002-03. Neither should we be so complacent as to
think that some high-level meetings, like presidential
summits, can paper over this rift. Such meetings cannot
substitute for a sound strategy and/or policy even
when officials claim that Presidents Putin and Bush
are confident that enough has been done to keep the
positive momentum of the relationship going.12 Russian
analysts certainly do not make this mistake. Instead,
they rightly point to the issue at stake, i.e., Moscow’s
insistence upon Russia’s standing or status as a great
power that demands Washington take its interests into
account. Thus Ivan Safranchuk of Moscow’s Office of
the Center for Defense Information told U.S. reporters
that,
In the United States there is an underestimation of how
serious Putin and his team are. This team is ready to
spoil relations with the United States as far as necessary.
There are no limitations. Putin is doing this not because
he wants a new Cold War, but because he wants the Russian state to be seriously revived.13

This demand lies at the heart of the issue because
Moscow at the very least believes that the West as a
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whole, and particularly America, do not take it or its
interests seriously enough. And, as suggested above
by a U.S. official, it is possible that we have an outright
rivalry over the entire or most of the two states’ bilateral
political agendas whereby Russia’s purpose is simply
to fight American policy. Thus what is at stake in the
Russo-American relationship is Russia’s resentment
of American power and the way it is displayed,
particularly in regions that Moscow wants to dominate.
In other words, Russia, like the late comedian Rodney
Dangerfield, constantly laments that it doesn’t get any
or enough respect from America. Putin’s presidential
envoy for relations with the European Union (EU),
Sergei Yastrzhembskiy, stated that this was Russia’s
main objection to recent developments in world
politics.14 Similarly Russian Ambassador to America
Yuri Ushakov recently echoed that statement.15
So while East-West relations have become
essentially adversarial, the most visible stresses are
in Russo-American relations. Baluyevsky said that
cooperation with the West has not helped Russia;
instead the situation has become more difficult. In
fact, “the U.S. military leadership’s course aimed at
maintaining its global leadership and expanding its
economic, political, and military presence in Russia’s
traditional zones of influence” is a top threat to its
national security.16 However, rhetoric aside, there is
no tangible military threat to Russia.17 Yet Moscow has
issued endless complaints that America does not take
Russia sufficiently seriously, i.e., at Moscow’s own
self-serving and inflated valuation of itself.
What Russia wants, though, is clear enough—
enhanced status and a completely free hand vis-à-vis
Washington and Europe on issues vital to it. Lavrov,
in a televised address denounced U.S. unilateralism
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and demanded “total equality, including equality
in the analysis of threats, in finding solutions, and
making decisions.” Likewise, Russia sees itself (or at
least professes to see itself) as a sovereign, i.e., wholly
independent, actor in world politics that should be
regarded as a superpower equal to America and be
able to constrain its policies while remaining free from
such constraints on what matters most to it, i.e., the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Indeed,
Putin at this Munich speech (and even earlier as well)
called for a new “architecture of global security” and his
actions before and after that speech indicate that Russia
is acting to bring such a structure—which it deems to
be a multipolar one—into being.18 Alternatively Russia
argues that a multipolar world where Russia is a free
standing independent actor is already taking shape.
Lavrov has also presented an elaborate assessment
of America’s declining power and moral standing in
the world as indicating and justifying the failure of
the unipolar project.19 Thus Washington’s hoped for
unipolar world cannot be achieved. Yastrzhembskiy
echoed this by claiming that Washington faces growing
international isolation due to the growing disparity
between its views and those of other governments.20
Putin’s litany of complaints in speeches going back
to 2006 specified Russia’s complaints in greater detail.
Putin specifically charged that,
• America is a unipolar hegemon which
conducts world affairs or aspires to do so in an
undemocratic way (i.e., it does not take Russian
interests into account).
• America has unilaterally gone to war in Iraq,
disregarding the United Nations (UN) Charter,
and demonstrating an “unconstrained hyper
use of force” that is plunging the world into an
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abyss. It has therefore become impossible to find
solutions to conflicts. (In other words, American
unilateralism actually makes it harder to end
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan—hardly an
incontestable proposition.) Because America
seeks to decide all issues unilaterally to suit its
own interests in disregard of others, “no one
feels safe” and this policy stimulates an arms
race and proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).
Therefore we need a new structure of world
politics, i.e., multipolarity and nonintervention
in the affairs of others. Here Putin cited Russia’s
example of a peaceful transition to democracy!
Of course, Russia hardly has a spotless record
with regard to nonintervention as Estonia,
Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia illustrate.
Putin expressed concern that the Moscow
Strategic Offensive Arms Reduction Treaty
of 2002 (SORT) may be violated or at least
undermined by America which is holding back
several hundred superfluous nuclear weapons
for either political or military use. America
is also creating new destabilizing high-tech
weapons, including space weapons.
Meanwhile the CFE treaty is not being ratified,
even though Russian forces are leaving Georgia
and only carrying out peacekeeping operations
in Moldova. Similarly, U.S. bases are turning
up “on our border.” (Here Putin revealed that
for him the border of Russia is, in fact, the old
Soviet border since Russia no longer borders
either on Romania or Poland.)
America is also extending missile defenses to
Central and Eastern Europe even though no
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threat exists that would justify this. In regard to
this program, Putin replied to a question at the
Wehrkunde Conference by saying that,
The United States is actively developing and
already strengthening an anti-missile defense
system. Today this system is ineffective but we
do not know exactly whether it will one day be
effective. But in theory it is being created for that
purpose. So, hypothetically, we recognize that
when this moment arrives, the possible threat from
our nuclear forces will be completely neutralized.
Russia’s present capabilities, that is. The balance
of powers will be absolutely destroyed and one
of the parties will benefit from the feeling of
complete security. That means that its hands will
be free not only in local but eventually also in
global conflicts.21

		

Thus he has bought the General staff’s habit
of thinking exclusively in terms of worst-case
scenarios to justify a policy of threats and
military buildup. Moreover, Baluyevsky and
the General Staff all regularly argue that because
there is allegedly no threat from Iran, these
missile defenses can only be aimed at Russia
and at threatening to neutralize its deterrent.22
• NATO expansion (the Russian term in
opposition to the Western word enlargement)
therefore bears no relationship to European
security but is an attempt to divide Europe and
threaten Russia.
• Finally, America seeks to turn the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) into an anti-Russian organization, and
nongovernment organizations (NGOs) are
also being used by individual governments
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for such purposes despite their so called
formal independence. Thus, revolutions in
CIS countries are fomented from abroad, and
elections there often are masquerades whereby
the West intervenes in their internal affairs.23
Obviously this view projects Russia’s own
politics and policies of interference in these
elections (e.g., the $300 million it spent and the
efforts of Putin’s “spin doctors” in Ukraine in
2004) onto Western governments and wholly
dismisses the sovereign internal mainsprings
of political action in those countries, another
unconscious manifestation of the imperial
mentality that grips Russian political thinking
and action.
It is hardly surprising, then, that Russian
commentators regularly say that “Russia’s strategic
worldview is fundamentally at odds with the American
one and perhaps with American perspectives on
international security.”24 Indeed, Lavrov recently
stated that the United States was perhaps Moscow’s
“most difficult” partner and should learn from its
mistakes in world politics.25 In that context, Russia’s
independence is the primary achievement of Russian
foreign and defense policy.26 Lavrov also observed
in 2005 that “We can come to the conclusion that the
whole complex of our [foreign] relations, the weight
of existing military and strategic links between Russia
and the [United States] . . . will be constantly declining.
We will never separate, but drifting away from each
other could have irreversible consequences.”27
But beyond that, Lavrov contended that while
America seeks to secure its global leadership status
based on military power, it lacks the financial, trade,
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economic, “and—last but not least—moral resources
to do so. [Thus], the West is losing the monopoly on
establishing rules of the game.”28 So, aligned to this
adversarial relationship is Russia’s growing belief that
its star is ascending, while the West and America are in
steady decline. Consequently, Russia is, or should be,
taking part in the formation of a new architecture of
international relations and playing a role as a “system
forming” power.29 Yet, simultaneously, Russia’s ruling
elite regime paradoxically regards itself and Russia as
being under constant threat from within and without
despite this ascent. This marriage of paranoia and
truculent boastfulness is unfortunately a Soviet, if not
tsarist, heritage of Russian diplomacy, especially when
things are going well for Moscow, and contains more
than a little imperial arrogance.30
Neither is this expectation of tension in the
bilateral relationship a uniquely Russian one. Russian
truculence towards America increases the likelihood of
comparable U.S. reactions over a broad range of issues.
Director of National Intelligence Vice Admiral John
McConnell (U.S. Navy Ret.), recently told the Senate
Armed Services Committee that,
Russian assertiveness will continue to inject elements of
rivalry and antagonism into U.S. dealings with Moscow,
particularly our interactions in the former Soviet Union,
and will dampen our ability to cooperate with Russia on
issues ranging from counterterrorism and nonproliferation to energy and democracy promotion in the Middle
East. As the Litvinenko murder demonstrates, the steady
accumulation of problems and irritants threatens to harm
Russia’s relations with the West more broadly.31

Department of Defense (DoD) Secretary Robert Gates’
testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in
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February 2007 about “the uncertain paths of China and
Russia, which are both pursuing sophisticated military
modernization programs” and Putin’s overly alarmist
reply to it at Munich, already reflects the danger of
this element of rivalry and of reciprocal irritation that
McConnell warned about.32
Moscow’s argument that Russia does not get
enough respect, whatever its validity, also omits those
elements of Russian policy which have caused its
image to suffer in the West. Putin’s speeches omitted
mentioning the state-sponsored decline of Russian
democratic tendencies and institutions; Chechnya;
Russian intervention in Ukraine’s election in 2004;
its habitual use of the energy weapon to intervene in
Baltic, CIS, and East European governments’ policies,
threaten Transcaucasian regimes, and limit Central
Asian sovereignty; the fact that the expansion of the
U.S. military presence in Europe and missile defenses
were briefed extensively to Moscow since 2004-05; the
fact that Russia has tested intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) (both the stationary and mobile
version of the Topol-M or SS-27, as well as the shortrange Iskander missile) that, according to Putin and
Former Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, can beat any
missile defense; and the fact that these missiles are
now being mass produced.33 These Russian charges
also omit Moscow’s military intervention in Georgia’s
ethnic conflicts, Moldova, and Nagorno-Karabakh; and
its arms sales and nuclear technology transfer to states
like China, Iran, Syria, and Venezuela.34
Perhaps worse and more disheartening is that
Putin’s speeches and those of his subordinates
reflect that they still have a woefully incomplete and
distorted understanding of the West despite 15 years
of supposed democracy and freedom. Indeed, they are
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prone to accept the worst-case scenarios of Russian
intelligence services and elites who are notorious for
presenting distorted and utterly mendacious threat
and policy assessments. Either that or they share a
wholly cynical, materialistic, virtually exclusively
self-referential, and misconceived notion of Western
weakness, Russophobia, and disunity. To partisans
of this mindset, America does not count anymore as a
partner because Iraq has distracted it and diverted its
interest from Russia.35 It also is quite probably the case,
as defense correspondent Pavel Felgenhauer reports,
that,
Russia has a Prussian-style all-powerful General Staff
that controls all the different armed services and is more
or less independent of outside political constraints. Russian military intelligence—GRU, as big in size as the former KGB and spread over all continents—is an integral
part of the General Staff. Through GRU, the General
Staff controls the supply of vital information to all other
decision-makers in all matters concerning defense procurement, threat assessment, and so on. High-ranking
former GRU officers have told me that in Soviet times
the General Staff used the GRU to grossly, deliberately,
and constantly mislead the Kremlin about the magnitude and gravity of the military threat posed by the West
in order to help inflate military expenditure. There are
serious indications that at present the same foul practice
is continuing.36

For example, Putin complained that American
politicians are invoking a nonexistent Russian threat
to get more money for military campaigns in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Putin’s remarks represent a wholly
fabricated analysis of Secretary Gates’ testimony to
Congress, but signify that he wants to believe the worst
about American intentions as do the General Staff,
intelligence agencies, and like-minded Russian political
11

leaders.37 For example, in his press conference before
the annual G-8 conference in Heiligendam, Germany
in June 2007, Putin told reporters that Russia and the
West were returning to the Cold War and added that,
Of course, we will return to those times. And it is clear
that if part of the U.S. nuclear capability is situated in
Europe and that our military experts consider that they
represent a potential threat, then we will have to take
appropriate retaliatory steps. What steps? Of course, we
must have new targets in Europe. And determining precisely which means will be used to destroy the installations that our experts believe represent a potential threat
for the Russian Federation is a matter of technology. Ballistic or cruise missiles or a completely new system. I repeat that it is a matter of technology.38

Similarly, despite dozens of statements and briefings
to the contrary, Russian generals and politicians
insist that 10 missile defense radars and interceptors
stationed in the Czech Republic and Poland represent
a strategic threat to Russia and its nuclear deterrent
not because of what they are but because of what they
might be, just as Putin said above.39 Russia also charges
that rotational deployments of no more than 5,000
army and air force troops in Bulgaria and Romania
represents an imminent threat to deploy forces to the
Caucasus.40 Russian spokesmen view these new bases
and potential new missions of U.S. and NATO forces,
including missile defense and power projection into
the Caucasus or Central Asia, as anti-Russian threats,
especially as NATO has stated that it takes issues like
pipeline security in the Caucasus and its members’
energy security increasingly seriously.41 Yet actually
U.S. “bases” in Romania and Bulgaria are nothing more
than periodic rotational deployments of a small number
of Army and Air forces whose mission is primarily the
12

training of the forces of their host countries. They are
anything but a permanent base for strike forces in the
CIS and Moscow knows it.42 Indeed, in 2004 Defense
Minister Sergei Ivanov publicly accepted the reasons
behind America’s realignment of its forces and global
basing structure and did not find it alarming.43
No less consequential than the observation about
returning to the Cold War is that Putin’s statements
indicate his full acceptance of the General Staff’s vision
and version of ubiquitous a priori American and
Western threats expressed in a worst-case scenario.
Worse yet, he openly conceded their power to define
and formulate those threats and on that basis formulate
requirements for defense policy and strategy. Indeed,
here he openly invited the General Staff—these military
experts—to determine Russia’s threat assessment and
announced that the government would accept it. These
actions seriously jeopardize any hope for effective
civilian, not to mention, democratic control over the
armed forces.
Since Moscow neither faces an urgent or imminent
strategic or military threat nor does it claim to face
one, the threat it perceives is psychological, one of
influence and diminished status abroad. Thus when
Putin proposed in June 2007 that Washington share
the Russian radar at Gabala, Azerbaijan, with it as a
compromise, Yastrzhembskiy stated that, “We consider
this issue not a military question, but a political one.”44
Similarly the so-called threat from NATO enlargement,
for all the Russian complaints about it, was and
remains a psychological rather than strategic issue. The
innumerable statements by Russian generals that their
weapons could beat any missile defense confirm this
point. This gap between rhetoric and reality suggests
not just a desire to ratchet up threat assessments for
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political and economic benefits for the military and
political elites doing so within Russia, or a search
for foreign policy gains, but also a deliberate mis or
disinformation of the leadership and the population as
Felgenhauer suggests.
Certainly Russian charges that there is no Iranian
missile threat are unsustainable because Moscow’s
own analysts and Russian officials like Ivanov and
Baluyevsky acknowledge it.45 Commenting on Iran’s
launch in early 2007 of a suborbital weather rocket,
Lieutenant General Leonid Sazhin stated that “Iran’s
launch of a weather rocket shows that Tehran has
not given up efforts to achieve two goals—create its
own carrier rocket to take spacecraft to orbit and real
medium-range combat missiles capable of hitting
targets 3,000-5,000 miles away.”46 Although he argued
that this capability would not fully materialize for 3-5
years, it would also take that long to test and deploy
the American missile defenses that are at issue. Equally
significantly, Major-General Vitaly Dubrovin, a Russian
space defense expert, said flatly “now Tehran has a
medium-range ballistic missile, capable of carrying a
warhead.”47 Naturally, both men decried the fact that
Iran appears intent on validating American threat
assessments.48
Arguably Russia has accepted a threat perception
for which ultimately there is no solution but an arms
race. To take Russia at its own inflated self-valuation
means to privilege its interests and security above
those of every other state with which it either interacts
or with which it has a border. While Moscow obviously
wants that outcome, it is equally obvious that it would
have strongly negative consequences for many issues
in international affairs. Certainly doing so reinforces
Russian temptations towards autocracy and neo-
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imperial foreign policies for as the Russian philosopher
Sergei Gavrov writes,
The threats are utopian, the probability of their implementation is negligible, but their emergence is a sign.
This sign—a message to “the city and the world”—surely lends itself to decoding and interpretation: we will
defend from Western claims our ancient right to use our
imperial (authoritarian and totalitarian) domestic sociocultural traditions within which power does not exist to
serve people but people exist to serve power.49

Taking these inflated threat assessments at Russia’s
self-valuation and acting accordingly would therefore
have calamitous consequences throughout Eurasia.
Doing so only stimulates still more aggressive and
overbearing Russian behavior, while not getting
anything in return. This does not mean disrespecting
or gratuitously provoking Russia, but it does mean
that we should understand that its threat perceptions
and pretensions are greatly inflated, and we should
therefore defend our legitimate ground. While there
are actual areas where Russia might legitimately feel
that its interests are adversely affected by U.S. policies
and that such an assessment might be justified (see
below), most of what we have recently heard about
threats should not be included among them.
Indeed, numerous commentators have observed
that for some time Russia has cast itself as a “besieged
fortress,” charging Washington with imperialism,
launching an arms race, interfering in the domestic
policies of CIS states (including Russia), expanding
NATO, unilateralism, disregard for international
law when it comes to using force, and resorting to
military threats against Russian interests, etc.50 This
wide-ranging threat perception also embraces Russia’s
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domestic politics as well. Regime spokesmen, e.g.
Vladislav Surkov, also openly state that Russia must
take national control of all the key sectors of the economy
lest it be threatened by hostile foreign economic forces
and so called “offshore aristocrats.”51 In other words,
this threat perception links both internal and external
threats in a seamless whole (as did Leninism) and
represents the perception that Western democracy as
such is a threat to Russia. Therefore U.S. and Western
military power, even if it is not actually a threat, is a
priori perceived as such.
Thus the problem is not that Russia is insufficiently
respected abroad but rather that it defines its interests
in ways that postulate an intrinsically adversarial
relationship with the West, particularly Washington.
Russian policy operates, as the German philosopher
Carl Schmitt would have said, on the basis of the
“presupposition of enemies.” Consequently, Moscow
cannot accept that its problem lies not in Washington
or in the stars but in itself as much, if not more than,
in American policy. Indeed, the student of the Russian
press would have no trouble discerning this besieged
fortress mentality that permeates it and that can only be
triggered from above.52 As in the Soviet past, Moscow,
like Washington, remains wholly ethnocentric and
self-absorbed in its attitudes and relationship to the
external world. Russia’s single-minded pursuit of its
own concept of its interests also shows little respect for
or understanding of the reality of other governments’
policies or their opinions. Much of this syndrome is
traceable not to American policy, but to the nature
of the Russian political system. Hence the growing
standoff with Washington.
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Potential Consequences.
While (rightly or wrongly) nobody expects a
resurrection of the intense Cold War global geopolitical,
military, and ideological rivalry replete with the everpresent specter of nuclear war, the consequences of
this rift are profound. First, this rift has already begun
to stimulate renewed strategic arms buildups by both
sides. Second, this rift highlights the failure to transcend
the traditional agenda of past efforts at Russo-American
(or Soviet-American) partnership—i.e., international
security, strategic arms control, nonproliferation of
WMD, and energy cooperation—to a true strategic
partnership.53 Therefore issues of regional security
in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia have become
enmeshed with horizontal or vertical proliferation
threats in these regions, making them more intractable
and complicating the situation within which Eurasian
governments must operate.
At the same time, issues of regional security
throughout the CIS borderlands and in areas like the
Black Sea have also become a subject of Russo-American, if not East-West, contention. Some commentators,
like American conservative Bruce Jackson, proclaim that
Russia wages a “soft war” against Western influence in
Eastern Europe, including the Black Sea zone.54 But the
soft war also partakes of a classical geopolitical EastWest rivalry, e.g., Moscow’s attacks on the Amer-ican
military presence in and around the Black Sea and
concern about Bulgaria’s and Romania’s overall proWestern foreign and defense policies. Similar rivalries
occur throughout the entire post-Soviet periphery, the
Middle East, and Northeast Asia.
Finally, there is a significant ideological dimension
to this struggle. If it is not as intense as the Cold War
was, it is still a meaningful struggle over the issue of
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democracy and its expansion. This “values gap” is
expressed in Russian attacks on the OSCE and NGOs,
and in the deliberately widely-disseminated official
belief that Washington somehow is or was behind all
the color revolutions and is now seeking to undermine
other CIS governments, including Russia’s. As Robert
Kagan has recently noted, “If two of the world’s largest
powers [Russia and China-author] share a common
commitment to autocratic government, autocracy is
not dead as an ideology.”55
The consequences of this adversarial relationship go
beyond America, Russia, and their bilateral relations.
They also encompass ties with other parties in Europe,
the CIS, the Middle East, and Northeast Asia. Therefore
this growing antagonism has significant global
implications. And as it takes place in a less structured
world than during the Cold War where both sides,
to survive, had to acknowledge the other’s red lines,
today neither side needs each other. As the natural
deterring factors of the Cold War have evaporated, the
resulting situation is potentially more volatile, if not
dangerous.56 Moreover, as this adversarial relationship
grows in scope and in its multiple dimensions, those
consequences are already making themselves felt among
Russia’s neighbors, interlocutors, and peripheries:
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Therefore, this rift
possesses potentially significant strategic implications
for both Russia and the United States.
One view of these frictions is that they are tactical
not strategic. Consequently,
It is not that Moscow and Washington have strategic interests that are directly opposed to one another. In fact,
leaders in both capitals see eye-to-eye on the pressing
issues of nuclear proliferation and terrorism, and on
more long-term goals, such as managing a peaceful rise
of China. The problems seem to lie more in the tactics
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of achieving these strategic aims. Russian leaders have
a hard time conceding global leadership to Washington;
likewise many in the United States still harbor ingrained
prejudices against the longtime adversary in Moscow.57

However, that viewpoint clashes with the fact
that the repercussions of the bilateral tensions in this
relationship encompass so much of today’s global
security agenda. Second, this line of analysis plays
down the truly serious differences between the parties
and actually condescends towards Russian demands.
After all, it is precisely American leadership that
Russia is challenging. Third, this view also clashes
with the fact that the differences between both states
are not only strategic ones, they are also growing.
Thus there is a hardening conviction among Russian
elites that American policy in many of its dimensions,
both strategic and ideological—i.e., its rhetoric of
democratization—represents a fundamental threat
to the integrity and sovereignty of Russia. Or at least
they believe that no improvement in those relations is
possible in the foreseeable future.58
While we may regard such talk as an unmerited
manifestation of a well-developed and long-cultivated
Russian paranoia, Russia’s elite increasingly professes
that America resents Russia’s recovery, and attempts
to weaken it in order to ultimately undermine it. This
pervasive and unfounded view in Moscow triggers
the well-developed and long-cultivated psychological
armory of Russian responses, including the growing
truculence and resort to bullying of its neighbors
that we have seen in the Soviet, if not Imperial, past.
However, psychoanalyzing this relationship should
not lead us to discount the profound and immediately
tangible consequences of this rift for Russia’s neighbors
or interlocutors.
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For example, in 2005 Lithuanian Foreign Minister
Antanas Valionis observed that the issue of Russia’s
democratization was connected with key issues like
the provision of energy supplies to the Baltic states as
a whole; the inclusion of new members, e.g., Ukraine,
in NATO; and, most of all, with security throughout
the region. He stated that,
Finally, the strengthening or weakening of democracy
in Russia itself will have a pivotal influence on the region. If Russia is democratic, Lithuania will find itself
in the epicenter of very interesting events. If Russia will
be non-democratic, it is possible that after a certain time
period, something resembling the iron curtain will be
recreated. If we do not succeed in preventing that, we
will end up on the periphery of events. That is the essence of things—to make sure that the gas pipeline is not
exchanged for silence about human rights and democracy in Russia. Finally, the geopolitical fate of the world
in 15 to 20 years depends upon the question of Russia’s
democratization.59

Similarly, Walter Slocombe, Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy during the Clinton Administration,
testified to Congress in 1995 that “Russia’s development, both internal and external, is perhaps the central
factor in determining the overall fate and future of European security.”60 However, this argument’s validity is
not confined to one man, or one government, or even
to one continent—Europe—alone. What is true for the
Baltic littoral pertains with equal force throughout
Eurasia: As stated by Dr. Andrew Michta of the
Marshall Center in Garmisch, i.e., “the extent to which
regional security will balance between old and new
tasks will hinge on domestic political developments in
Russia as well as the progress of the current Russian
military modernization program to be completed in
2010.”61
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The intersection of numerous and overlapping
global developments and crises—the war on terrorism,
Iraq, the energy crisis, and the rise of China and India
in Asia—enhances the significance of geostrategic
trends in Russia and its peripheries. And these trends
certainly include regression towards autocracy for it
encourages and allows the aggressive tendencies so
visible in contemporary Russian foreign policy. As
Kagan observes,
It certainly would be a strategic error to allow Putin and
any possible successor to strengthen their grip on power
without outside pressures for reform, for the consolidation of autocracy at home will free the Russian leadership to pursue greater nationalist ambitions abroad. In
these and other autocracies, including Iran, promoting
democracy and human rights exacerbates internal political contradictions and can have the effect of blunting
external ambitions as leaders tend to more dangerous
threats from within.62

The common thread of perceiving America as a
threat in both geopolitical and ideological terms has
also united Moscow and Beijing in a common cause.63
Already in the 1990s, prominent analysts of world
politics like Richard Betts and Robert Jervis, and then
subsequent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) studies,
postulated that the greatest security threat to American
interests would be a Russian-Chinese alliance.64
Arguably, that is happening now and occurs under
conditions of the energy crisis that magnifies Russia’s
importance to China beyond providing diplomatic
support, cover for China’s strategic rear, and arms
sales.65
Several analysts of trends in East Asia see the
confluence of the energy and other current international
crises contributing to a Russo-Chinese alliance that
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has already formed in opposition to American power
and ideas. That alliance would encompass points of
friction with Washington: strategic resistance to U.S.
interests in Central and Northeast Asia; resistance
to antiproliferation and pressures upon the regimes
in Iran and North Korea; an energy alliance; an
ideological counteroffensive against U.S. support for
democratization abroad; and the rearming of both
Russia and China, if not their proxies and allies, with
a view towards conflict with America.66 South Korean
columnist Kim Yo’ng Hu’i wrote in 2005 that,
China and Russia are reviving their past strategic partnership to face their strongest rival, the United States.
A structure of strategic competition and confrontation
between the United States and India on the one side, and
Russia and China on the other is unfolding in the eastern
half of the Eurasian continent including the Korean peninsula. Such a situation will definitely bring a huge wave
of shock to the Korean peninsula, directly dealing with
the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea. If China
and Russia train their military forces together in the sea
off the coast of China’s Liaodong Peninsula, it will also
have an effect on the 21st century strategic plan of Korea. We will now need to think of Northeast Asia on a
much broader scale. The eastern half of Eurasia, including Central Asia, has to be included in our strategic plan
for the future.67

Since then, Lyle Goldstein and Vitaly Kozyrev have
similarly written that,
If the Kremlin favors Beijing, the resulting Sino-Russian
energy nexus—joining the world’s fastest growing energy consumer with one of the world’s fastest growing producers—would support China’s growing claim
to regional preeminence. From Beijing’s point of view,
this relationship would promise a relatively secure and
stable foundation for one of history’s most extraordinary
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economic transformations. At stake are energy reserves
in eastern Russia that far exceed those in the entire Caspian basin. Moreover, according to Chinese strategists,
robust Sino-Russian energy links would decrease the
vulnerability of Beijing’s sea lines of communication to
forms of “external pressure” in case of a crisis concerning Taiwan or the South China Sea. From the standpoint
of global politics, the formation of the Sino-Russian energy nexus would represent a strong consolidation of an
emergent bipolar structure in East Asia, with one pole
led by China (and including Russia) and one led by the
United States (and including Japan).68

Russia’s tie to China certainly expresses a deep
strategic identity or congruence of interests on a host
of issues from Korea to Central Asia and could have
significant military implications. Those implications
are not just due to Russian arms sales to China which
are clearly tied to an anti-American military scenario,
most probably connected with Taiwan. They also
include the possibility of joint military action in
response to a regime crisis in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) as suggested by the joint
maneuvers of the Russian and Chinese militaries in
2005 and 2007.69 Thus we could be on the verge of a
new strategic bipolarity that bifurcates Europe and
Asia and places Washington and Moscow on opposite
sides in both peacetime and times of crises.70 Equally
disquieting is that many analysts in both Russia and
America expect bilateral relations to worsen in the
foreseeable future, not least because Russian observers
expect the current Congress to be more anti-Russian
than its predecessor.71
Despite occasional U.S. and European efforts to
soften the rhetoric, chances are that this forecast of
worsening relations will actually materialize. Even
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though Putin has stated that the United States is a
major, if not the only, partner for Russia on issues of
disarmament and global security, nonproliferation,
global health, combating poverty, and trade, and that
this partnership could soon expand in ways not yet
foreseen, Putin’s visible contempt for Western policy at
the 2006 G-8 meeting in St. Petersburg and afterwards,
has manifested itself in even more sarcastic fashion
72
than was previously the case. And the systematic
flooding of the Russian media with anti-American
propaganda certainly adds to the likelihood of longterm estrangement.
Since Russia is now experiencing a succession
scenario which is the achilles heel of its political system
but which will also drive all Russian politics even further
in an anti-Western direction, Russian elites have every
incentive to keep stoking this fire. But they and we must
remember that the consequences of intensifying this
adversarial quality of the bilateral relationship could
be very negative for international security. In previous
cases, Russian rulers have resorted to violence and
fomented crises so as to secure domestic popularity
and legitimacy, e.g., Yeltsin’s war with Chechnya in
1994.73 Likewise, several Western scholars, including
this author, believe that the 1999 succession crisis was
managed in such a way as to tie Putin’s ascension to
power to the incitement of the war in Chechnya.74 The
seizure of Yukos and the arrest of its chief executives,
Platon Lebedev and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in 200304 represent another example of the resort to direct
force and the fomenting of a crisis to further narrow
the possibilities for democratization and strike at
Westernizing forces in Russia.75 It is entirely possible,
then, that this discernibly enhanced aggressiveness and
threat-mongering are intended, as Gavrov and many
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other Russian analysts suggest, to create a favorable
domestic environment for the succession.76
Under the most favorable explanation for recent
political violence and assassinations directed against
regime critics like Anna Politkovskaya and Alexnader
Litvinenko, alleged “rogue elements” of the FSB are
trying to impose one or another’s political scenario
upon Russia and destabilize the Putin regime. If this is
true, it hardly furnishes evidence of Russia’s reliability
or stability with regard to world politics. And if the
state committed those assassinations, then we are
dealing with what truly is a criminalized and rogue
state. This last charge is not as surprising as it may
seem, for Russian and foreign observers have long
pointed to the integration of criminal elements with
the energy, intelligence, and defense industrial sectors
of the economy.77
Second, every succession since 1991 has been the
result of violence or electoral fraud, if not both phenomena.78 Consequently Russia’s importance as a major
energy and military (and recovering military) power, its
function as the sponsor of anti-democratic movements
or trends and alibi of last resort throughout the CIS for
such tendencies, its ability to block nonproliferation
or to provide arms, nuclear reactors, know how, and
substantial political support for anti-Western and antiAmerican regimes, e.g., Iran and Myanmar, and even
for terrorist movements, and, finally, the link between
its fundamental domestic instability and its foreign
policy, leads it to figure prominently in many different
potential threat scenarios. As one recent American
assessment observes,
The central puzzle of Russian politics is that 15 years after the collapse of the USSR, the country still lacks any
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stable and legitimate form of state order. The result is
continuing pervasive political and social uncertainty—
concretized in the palpable official fear that independent
civil society organizations might promote additional
“color revolutions” in Russia or other post-Soviet states
and the endless rumors about various unconstitutional
or semi constitutional schemes Putin might employ to
stay in power after his formal second term ends in March
2008. Bearing in mind that Russia remains the world’s
largest country by territory and still possesses thousands
of nuclear warheads as well as large stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, such
uncertainty could quickly become a major international
problem as well.79

These political conditions duly represent some of the
reasons why even Russian analysts admit that Russia
remains “a risk factor” in world politics, not the reliable
80
pole of world politics that it claims to be.
Although some, including U.S. officials, may
believe that Russia’s hostile rhetoric is connected with
the upcoming succession to Putin, at best that is only
partly the case.81 Russia’s adversarial posture towards
America and the West is not just a ploy to mobilize
support for the regime, though it is that. Rather, this
policy is intrinsically linked to and grows out of
Russia’s regression towards a police state, where the
police rule through the state and the state enforces a
stifling tutelage over the citizenry.82 In other words, as
both foreign and domestic observers have written, this
systematically inculcated authoritarian, anti-American
line and gravitation towards China are systemically
and structurally driven.83 Or, as Lilya Shevtsova has
written, anti-Westernism is the new national idea.84
Thus Vladimir Shlapentokh has shown that an essential
component of the Kremlin’s ideological campaign
to maintain the Putin regime in power and extend it
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(albeit under new leadership) past the elections of 2008
is anti-Americanism. As he wrote,
The core of the Kremlin’s ideological strategy is to convince the public that any revolution in Russia will be
sponsored by the United States. Putin is presented as a
bulwark of Russian patriotism, as the single leader able
to confront America’s intervention in Russian domestic
life and protect what is left of the imperial heritage. This
propaganda is addressed mostly to the elites (particularly elites in the military and FSB) who sizzle with hatred
and envy of America.85

Similarly, Minxin Pei of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace observes that,
The rapid improvement in ties and growing cooperation
between China and Russia owes, to a great extent, not to
any Chinese new initiative, but to Russia’s changing relationship with the West under Vladimir Putin’s rule. As
President Putin became increasingly authoritarian, he
needed China as an ally in counterbalancing the West.
The net strategic effect of Russia’s reorientation of its
policy toward the West has been tremendously positive
for China.86

Russia’s threat perceptions are either oriented
towards terrorism from the south, as was generally
the case even until 2006, or more recently primarily
to the West.87 Key Russian officials now proclaim that
the greatest threats to Russia come from the West,
supposedly in the form of NATO’s enlargement
(although NATO is a shadow of its past military
strength); American military power in both its
conventional and nuclear aspects; or as President Bush
himself has now recognized, in the form of demands
for greater democratization.88 Recently Putin himself,
stated that,
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You know, I think that the problem in international relations today is that there is increasingly less respect for
the basic principles of international law. There is an ever
growing desire to resolve this or that issue based on the
political considerations and expediency of the moment.
This is very dangerous, and it is precisely this that leads
to small countries not feeling secure. It is also this that
fuels the arms race in large countries.89

Lavrov has duly echoed this assessment.90 It is
unlikely, though, that either he or Putin had Russian
policy towards Chechnya, Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus,
Moldova, the Baltic states, or Russian domestic policy
in mind when they made these statements.
Military and Nuclear Issues.
The repercussions of this rift with the West are
particularly visible in Russian military policy. Indeed,
in the military, we find the threat assessments claiming
that Russia faces a threat situation comparable to that
of the 1930s America stated in Ministry of Defense and
General Staff journals as a matter of course.91
Obviously this argument invokes the traditional
specter of a large-scale continental or even intercontinental war and Western invasion of Russia to
elicit more resources from the government. Yet it is
not an inaccurate representation of Russian defense
thinking. Putin’s statements above (and below), as
well as those by other key spokesmen and/or analysts,
display the growing belief in a Western threat.
Russian political and military literature abounds
with charges that Washington seeks to “crush”
Russia and is organizing secret plans to undermine
or overthrow the Russian government by fomenting
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new “color revolutions” to follow Georgia, Ukraine,
and Kyrgyzstan.92 Neither are these apprehensions
intended only for domestic consumption because they
influence policy and force deployments in Russia and
possibly in the United States as well, especially with
regard to nuclear weapons. For example, Russian
officials have blocked discussions of reducing tactical
nuclear weapons (TNW) in Europe, not least because
they see them as weapons to stop a NATO or American
conventional offensive and restore intrawar stability
and escalation control.93 Thus Ivanov’s remarks about
Russia’s capability to launch mass production of
missiles apply to them as well.94
Regarding strategic nuclear weapons and missile
defenses, the situation is no better. Moscow regards
Washington’s policies of leaving the Antiballistic Missile
(ABM) treaty, building missile defenses in Poland
and the Czech Republic, seeking to militarize space,
and conventional and nuclear force modernization as
posing a combination of threats to it. Thus beyond its
own urgent, long overdue, and ongoing conventional
modernization, it has announced plans for qualitative
modernization of its strategic and tactical nuclear
systems through 2020.95 Evidently Moscow expects
a confrontation involving the threat or even use of
nuclear or space weapons and a concomitant urgent
necessity of rebuilding its conventional and nuclear
forces.96 The program outlined below, according to
Ivanov, will allow Russia to replace 45 percent of its
existing arsenals with modern weapons by 2015.
Thus, Ivanov has recently unveiled plans to build by
that date: 50 new Topol-M ICBM complexes on mobile
launchers, 34 new silo-based Topol-M missiles and
control units, 50 new bombers, 31 ships; and to fully
rearm 40 tank, 97 infantry, and 50 parachute battalions.
Forty Topol-M silo-based missiles have already been
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deployed. In 2007 alone, the military would get 17 new
ballistic missiles rather than 4 a year, as has recently
been the case, and 4 spacecraft and booster rockets.
It would overhaul a long-range aviation squadron, 6
helicopter and combat aviation squadrons, and 7 tank
and 13 motor rifle battalions. In 2007 alone, 11 billion
dollars will be spent on new weapons, and 31 new ships
will be commissioned, including 8 fleet ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs) carrying ICBMs (presumably the
forthcoming Bulava missile). And in 2009-10, Russia
will decide whether or not to build a new shipyard
for the construction of aircraft carriers, and 50 Tu-160
Blackjack and Tu-95 Bear Strategic Bombers will operate
over this period as well. Doctrinally, Russia will also
retain its right of launching preemptive strikes.97
In and of itself, this program does not necessarily
revive the Cold War confrontation or an inherently antiAmerican program of arms racing; the modernization
of Russia’s weapons is desperately needed. But this
program does betray a heightened threat assessment
and the growing strategic importance and even
utility attached by Moscow to nuclear weapons. The
latter point, of course, is one for which America is
often blamed, but has figured prominently in official
Russian doctrine and strategy at least since 1993.98
Indeed, it appears that Russia has unilaterally violated
President Boris Yeltsin’s commitment for disarmament
of Russian attack or multipurpose submarines so that
they would not carry tactical nuclear weapons (TNW)
and is deploying these weapons on attack submarines
“on combat patrols.”99 Moscow now advocates a
legally binding treaty saying that U.S. and Russian
nuclear arsenals do not target each other in order to
dispel this alleged threat.100 This request appears to
be purely propagandistic since Presidents Yeltsin

30

and Clinton agreed to this over a decade ago, and the
required computer programs for targeting could be
reinstated at a moment’s notice. So it appears that we
will see what Putin calls an “asymmetrical but highly
efficient” Russian response, perhaps in its new Bulava
or Topol missiles that supposedly can avoid or spoof
missile defenses.101 But this reply also suggests the
potential return of the competitive procurement spiral
that featured so prominently during the Cold War.
This intensified threat assessment contradicts
earlier statements by Ivanov and Putin dating back
to 2001 that the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty
may have been a mistake but not a threat to Russia.
Alarmist threat briefings that these missile defenses,
America’s conventional force modernization, or its
nuclear programs reflect an urgent and growing threat,
display either a misunderstanding (whether deliberate
or unintentional) of U.S. policy or an apprehension
that the cherished dream of a closed bloc in the former
Soviet Union and great power status are at risk.102
Thus the outbreak of this rhetoric reflects deeper
political exigencies that drive Russian policy, not
some major change in what the Soviets used to call
the correlation of forces. For example, the Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) of 2002, also
known as the Moscow treaty, essentially uncoupled
U.S. and Russian strategic force modernization
programs from each other. The treaty stipulated that
both sides can build whatever nuclear forces they
need within the treaty’s limits without referring to
the other side’s programs or directly countering them
in their own force building programs.103 However,
thanks to the controversy on missile defense, Russia
now insists that if the United States unilaterally installs
missile defenses in Eastern Europe, it will affect Russo-
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NATO relations, create confrontations in Europe, and
in general end civilization as we know it. Therefore,
Washington must first involve Russia before it makes
any such deployment.104 At the same time, Putin and
his minions say that if America accepts his proposals
for missile defense cooperation based on the system
at Gabala or alternatively on a new one being built
at Armavir in the North Caucasus, then the bilateral
relationship can become once again a strategic one and
lead to a “revolution” in world politics. But if we do
not accept this, then, of course, the regression to a neoCold War situation is implicit in those statements.105
As part of this recent proposal for use of the Gabala
installation and in the overall controversy over missile
defense, Russia evidently again wants a veto or at least
a “droit de regard” (right of regard) over U.S. and
NATO military programs, particularly ones within
what Russia calls the vicinity of its borders or interests.
But these demands also show that with regard to
Washington, Moscow operates its policies from the
presupposition of enemies.
Given the several years of briefings and
consultations involved among all the parties including
Russia, American unilateralism is not the issue here.
Rather, it is an attempt by Russia to force America to
give Russia a veto over its policies and trigger further
dissension in NATO. Thus Baluyevsky argued that “In
our opinion, military activity by the alliance close to
Russia’s borders should be comprehensible to Russia
and commensurate with the new challenges and
threats that are rising. At the same time Russia has an
interest in having a predictable partner in the shape
of NATO.”106 This demand is, in fact, a tried, tested,
but also tired Soviet and post-Soviet refrain. Obviously
this is unacceptable to Washington, NATO, and its
members.
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Even though there is no military threat as Russian
military men admit, and as did Putin in 2001, Russia,
especially its armed forces and political leaders, cannot
relinquish the belief in NATO and America as an a priori
enemy. They are still tied to the presupposition of an
enemy and to a relationship based on the expectation
of a threat, i.e., a relationship of deterrence rather than
of defense. Lavrov recently underscored this point. He
told an interviewer for Rossiyskaya Gazeta that,
Our main criterion is ensuring the Russian Federation’s
security and maintaining strategic stability as much as
possible. . . . We have started such consultations already.
I am convinced that we need a substantive discussion on
how those lethal weapons could be curbed on the basis
of mutual trust and balance of forces and interests. We
will insist particularly on this approach. We do not need
just the talk that we are no longer enemies and therefore
we should not have restrictions for each other. This is
not the right approach. It is fraught with an arms race, in
fact, because, it is very unlikely that either of us will be
ready to lag behind a lot.107

Thus he emphasized that in an atmosphere of political
mistrust and where both sides’ deployments are still
based on the philosophy of deterrence and mutual
assured destruction, strategic unilateralism is both
unacceptable and indeed dangerous to all because it
stimulates arms races across the world. In other words,
American unilateralism is inherently a threat to Russia
wherever it appears because Russia cannot but proceed
from the a priori assumption of hostile American
interest, i.e., the presupposition of an enemy.
Thus the problem and the threats that we face as
this relationship erodes are not due to Russia’s military
modernization but rather to the overall deterioration
of Russo-American relations or to the failure to break
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out of past cognitive paradigms. And here Russia,
precisely because it has reverted to previous policies,
structures, and mentalities, is as much to blame as is
the United States. Whereas the United States is moving
or has sought to move toward a strategic relationship
based on partnership with Russia, defense against and
dissuasion of enemies, and lessened reliance on nuclear
weapons and deterrence vis-à-vis Russia and other
states, Russia cannot overcome the past.108 It remains
committed to a strategy and posture of deterrence
that postulates an inherently adversarial relationship
with the United States. Russian analysts recognize
the continuing conformity of Russian policy with
Schmitt’s notion of the presupposition of the enemy
as an approach to national security policy in Russia.109
That failure to break out of past paradigms, however
it is understood, inevitably heightens the impact of
geostrategic rivalry across the entire Russo-American
agenda and in international relations more broadly.
Thus Lavrov complains that “we are being called
upon to fight a hypothetical threat (i.e., intermediate
range missiles from Iran that could hit Europe) while a
real threat to our security is looming.” This statement
falsely negates what Russian military men and Lavrov
know to be a real and growing threat from Iran’s missile,
nuclear, and space programs.110 But the threat that
really alarms Lavrov here, a nonmilitary one it should
be noted, is one that has frightened Russian statesmen
for centuries, namely the idea of a unified Europe from
which it is isolated. So Lavrov went on to warn that
NATO, the OSCE, and the CFE Treaty, the pillars of the
European security system, are being converted into a
bloc policy which would fold up the reform of Europe’s
security architecture that Russia desires and bifurcate
Europe.111 That Moscow’s policy toward Europe
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aspires to strategic bipolarity throughout Eurasia, as
described below, seems to have eluded Lavrov here,
but underscores the fundamentally psychological
resentment of lost power and craving for status with
America that drives Russian policy.
Potential U.S. Threats to Russia and Inflated Russian
Threat Perceptions.
To say this is not to deny that possible changes in
U.S. force structures and deployments could provide
a threat or threats to Russia. Indeed, the best available
studies of American nuclear policies, including
modernization of those weapons, highlight the fact that
these policies, including the introduction into practice
of new concepts like dissuasion and preemptive, if not
preventive, war, could, if they have not already done
so, develop into perceived potential threats to Russia
in the near future.112 Oddly enough, though, these
potential threats are hardly ever mentioned in Russian
commentary. This suggests, once again, that it is internal
Russian perceptions as much as actual realities that are
driving policy. As an example of these potential threats,
although the United States has upgraded its naval and
other strategic forces and is gradually shifting them
to the Pacific Ocean largely to meet potential North
Korean or Chinese contingencies, those deployments
also could threaten Russian forces.113 But Moscow has
said little or nothing about these forces.
A second, equally negative possible outcome is that
American policymakers will come to perceive Russia
not just as a recalcitrant independent actor that does
not want to cooperate with America, but as a potential
or even active threat in its own right. As this potential
inheres primarily in Russia’s nuclear capability, the
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developments cited here are already creating a climate
among government circles in which Russia can quickly
come to be seen as a potential military threat due to
its political differences with America. For example,
the recent Report of the Defense Science Board on
Nuclear Capabilities stated openly that nuclear
reductions agreed to in the Moscow treaty of 2002 and
recommended in the Nuclear Posture Review of 2001
pointed to a new and benign strategic relationship with
Russia after the end of the Cold War and the desire
to forge a new bilateral strategic relationship that no
longer was based on the principles of Mutual Assured
Destruction.
Today, the Report observes, that presumption
of a new benign strategic relationship with Russia is
increasingly open to doubt. This is because, “Although
United States relations with Russia are considered
relatively benign at the moment [December 2006],
Russia retains the capacity to destroy the United
States in 30 minutes or less.” Moreover, its reliance
on nuclear weapons to compensate for a weakened
conventional military has led it to emphasize nuclear
weapons for purposes of maintaining superpower
status, deterrence, and potentially warfighting. Russia’s
regression from democracy, and rivalry with America
over Iraq, Iran, and Central Asia [other issues may well
be added since then to the mix—author], suggest that
the assessment of 2003 that nothing had changed since
2001 to justify revising the Nuclear Posture Review’s
(NPR) presumption of a benign strategic relationship
with Russia needs to be revised.114 Therefore, the Report
recommends the creation of a permanently standing
assessment “Red Team” “to continuously assess the
range of emerging and plausible nuclear capabilities
that can threaten the United States and its allies and
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friends with potentially catastrophic consequences.”115
This team would monitor Russian, Chinese, and North
Korean developments because,
Despite the desire for improved relations with Russia,
the direction, scope, and pace of the evolution of U.S.
capabilities must be based on a realistic recognition that
the United States and Russia are not yet the reliable,
trusted friends needed for the United States to depart
from a commitment to a robust nuclear deterrent. Intentions can change overnight; capabilities cannot.”116

Other examples of a growing wariness about
Russian intentions can also be cited.117 Thus there is a
real danger that these perceptions can grow on both
sides into self-fulfilling threat perceptions that will
drive conventional and nuclear defense acquisitions
and foreign policy decisions as well until they influence
formal doctrinal and strategic pronouncements. Some
Russian military observers have already openly
postulated that Russia and America (or NATO) are
still enemies. For example, Colonel Anatoly Tsyganok,
a noted military commentator speaking about the
increase in large-scale and regular Russian military
exercises, observed that apart from the need to conduct
such exercises as part of the Army’s regular routine,
they are necessary to respond to American deployments
in places like Hungary and Bulgaria. Both sides, he
says, remain enemies, and these exercises are hardly
antiterrorist ones but rather something else (i.e., he hints
at their being intended to be anti-NATO).118 Certainly
and similarly, the so-called “Ivanov doctrine” of 2003,
formalized in a Russian white paper that did not name
NATO, was oriented nonetheless to the primacy of a
NATO/American threat.119
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Nevertheless for such threats to be actualized and
formalized in official state papers like defense doctrines,
the political climate between Moscow and Washington
would have to decline still further. Consequently, while
we should not rush to restore the Cold War, the present
trends on both sides are disturbing and destabilizing,
not only for what they mean to each other but also
because of their impact on regional security throughout
Eurasia and how they affect the calculations of other
nuclear states or states that seek nuclear weapons like
Iran and North Korea. In other words, these tensions
cannot be confined to discussions of bilateral strategy
and politics but deeply impinge upon the problems of
regional security, global proliferation, and deterrence.
In fact, in the context of charges raised in 2006
that the United States now has and has been striving
for a usable first-strike nuclear capability against
Russian forces—an argument that ignited a firestorm
of polemics in Russia-–such interactive Russian and
American deployments of both conventional and
nuclear forces do, in fact, raise the prospect of real
as opposed to notional threats of an arms race where
Washington seems to move for a supposed first-strike
capability in both Russian and Western strategic
analyses.120 Thus David McDonough’s analysis of U.S.
nuclear deployments in the Pacific Ocean states that,
The increased deployment of hard-target kill weapons in
the Pacific could only aggravate Russian concerns over
the survivability of its own nuclear arsenal. These silobusters would be ideal to destroy the few hundred ICBM
silos and Russia’s infamously hardened command-andcontrol facilities as well as help reduce any warning
time for Russian strategic forces, given their possible
deployment and depressed trajectory. This is critical
for a decapitation mission, due to the highly centralized
command-and-control structure of the Russian posture,
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as well as to preempt any possible retaliation from the
most on-alert Russian strategic forces. The Pacific also
has a unique feature in that it is an area where gaps in
Russian early-warning radar and the continued deterioration of its early-warning satellite coverage have made
it effectively blind to any attack from this theatre. This
open-attack corridor would make any increase in Pacific-deployed SLBMs appear especially threatening.121

Similarly, already in 2003 when the first reports of
the Pentagon’s interest in new low-yield and bunkerbusting nuclear weapons became public, Russian
analysts warned that even if such programs are merely
in a research stage, they would add to the hostile
drift of Russo-American relations.122 Events since
then have only confirmed this assessment and their
warning. Meanwhile, the trend continues towards
increasing Russian reliance upon nuclear weapons
against a perceived growing American threat. This
threat perception and reliance upon nuclear weapons
takes place despite American assertions that charges
of excessive U.S. reliance on nuclear forces; that the
United States is either not reducing nuclear forces or
doing so fast enough; that the United States is building
new and more dangerous nuclear weapons; that the
United States is lowering the threshold for nuclear
weapons use by emphasizing preemption; and that
these alleged failures and the supposed failure to sign
new arms control treaties are encouraging proliferation
are myths.123 So if we may paraphrase a famous movie
line, “What we have here is a failure to communicate,”
while both sides appear to be sinking deeper into their
self-justifying perceptions.
For example, even less plausibly, Russian spokesmen
regularly and increasingly decry the U.S. intention to
build missile defenses bases in Poland and in the Czech
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Republic as threats to Russian security because they
will really be used, so they say, against Russia, and
not Iran, so as to render Russia’s first or second strike
capability impotent or to threaten such outcomes.124
The ensuing nuclear blackmail would allegedly then
be used to further reduce Russia’s foreign policy and
military capabilities, standing, and security. Lavrov
and other officials have now frequently reiterated that
“the military presence of the United States in Europe is
becoming a strategic factor.”125
Baluyevsky too attacked this deployment because
it could touch off an arms race in many countries (the
hidden idea being that Russia could not keep up with
the pace of America and China), and that these defenses
are not needed because neither Iran nor North Korea
has the capability to strike at Europe or America. Thus
these missile defenses are there to threaten Russia and
deprive it of access to key zones along its frontier—
perhaps the real threat in political terms. Missile
launchers could be converted to interceptors that
strike throughout European Russia; the missiles will
not actually defend against all incoming attacks (which
is strange since he said there were no attacks to be
expected); they create possible ecological nightmares
or even wars in Europe, etc.126 These rhetorical salvos
are coming fast and furious even though dispassionate
and thorough Russian analyses, e.g., by Alexei Arbatov
of the Carnegie Endowment in Moscow, demonstrate
that these missile defenses cannot possibly threaten
Russia.127 Hence the demand for more American
transparency concerning those missiles and their
purpose as well as some kind of binding agreement that
Russia cannot be and is not a target of those missiles.128
Furthermore, the internal contradictions among them,
e.g., that Iran simultaneously is and is not a threat or
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that Russian missiles could spoof defenses, etc., indicate
just how seriously these threat assessments should be
taken.
Thus, this demand for suspending the program,
along with multiple complaints that Washington
has not answered Russia’s questions, etc., are one
large bluff inasmuch as Russia also received over 10
technical briefings on this program.129 The artificiality,
not to mention systematic mendacity, of this campaign
is all too redolent of Soviet tactics and suggests
another attempt to divide Washington and Europe
from each other by frightening the latter even as it
reflects the abiding status insecurity that underlies so
much of Russian foreign policy. And, of course, the
other critical goal of this campaign is to prevent any
American military presence in the former Warsaw Pact
states, not to mention the former Soviet Union, so as to
leave open the possibility of their remaining a Russian
sphere of influence.
At the same time, this campaign also illustrates the
Russian military-political elite’s inability to reconcile
themselves to a diminished budget and status, and
finally their consistent belief that America and NATO
are enemies of Russia. As Nikolai Sokov recently
wrote, in regard to the study by Keir Lieber and Daryl
Press about U.S. strategic capabilities that generated so
much heat in Russia,130
The reason why hardliners in Russia pay so much attention to the state of the U.S.-Russian strategic balance
(and why they continue to discuss it in terms of “parity”
rather than retaliatory capability) is that they conceive of
U.S.-Russian relations today in the same terms as during
the Cold War. The underlying unspoken assumption of
the Lieber-Press study is that a systematic fundamental
conflict either exists or could emerge in the future; this
assumption is not lost on Russian hardliners.131
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Other implications of the growing antagonism
between Washington and Moscow have also made
themselves felt in military affairs. Coordination with
NATO has turned out to be much less than what was
hoped for once it began in 2002.132 Indeed, Sergei Ivanov
admitted that Russo-NATO cooperation in fighting
terrorism has not reached the desired level, and that
development of medium-term plans for cooperation in
countering security threats in general is needed. Thus
the NATO-Russia Council has been only a political
factor with limited effectiveness in shaping military
outcomes or a fundamental change in international
relations.133 Similarly U.S.-Russian and NATO-Russian
planned exercises in Russia were suddenly cancelled
just before they were supposed to start in September
2006.134
Russian military writers likewise regularly inveigh
against what they consider to be NATO and American
plans to encircle Russia with both conventional and
nuclear weapons at bases either in the Baltic, Poland,
and Eastern Europe, or from attempts to place U.S.
military bases within the CIS.135 Lavrov, for example,
warned that the failure of NATO members and the
Baltic states to ratify the CFE treaty (which they will
not do because of Russian deployments in Moldova
and Georgia in violation of the OSCE’s Istanbul accords
of 1999) plus the enlargement of NATO, the resulting
conventional imbalance, and the U.S. military presence
in Europe all constitute a strategic factor, i.e., threats to
Russia.136 In addition,
Perceived foreign threats also include military buildup(s) changing the balance near the borders of Russia
and its allies, anti-Russian policies of certain neighboring governments, and the US withdrawal from
the 1972 ABM Treaty announced by the G. W. Bush
[Administration].137
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As we have seen above, these so-called threats do not
exist. Indeed, Sergei Ivanov as Defense Minister said as
much in 2004.138 Therefore these claims are essentially
phantoms for justifying Russia’s foreign and domestic
policy goals as well as the military’s campaign for more
money and high-tech weapons against NATO and
America. But because the real threats facing Russia are
internal in nature, this perception of Russia as a besieged
fortress and the primary global counterpole to America
and the West demonstrate that Moscow’s inability to
find a point of domestic stability and legitimacy carries
over into its foreign and defense policies. These facts
also suggest that a fundamental problem in the RussoNATO relationship is the unyielding opposition of the
MOD and the government to genuine defense reform
and strategic cooperation which would entail, among
other things, eliminating the ingrained presupposition
of enemies and policies deriving from that posture.139
All these trends highlight an increasing Russian
ambivalence about the arms control treaties of the
1980s and 1990s like the CFE Treaty of Paris of 1990
and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Washington
Treaty of 1987. Ivanov has frequently called all of these
treaties, including the START I Treaty, relics of the Cold
War.140 Since then Lavrov, Baluyevsky, and Putin have
threatened to withdraw from the CFE treaty, called
it meaningless, and blamed NATO for not ratifying
it (even though Moscow refuses to pull its forces out
of Moldova) and for deploying forces in the states
of new members.141 Clearly, the Russian debate over
these treaties is closely linked to the issue of NATO’s
enlargement and their impact and continuation are
seen in the context of that expansion. This debate also
reveals the persistence of Cold War thinking in Moscow.
But this debate over existing arms treaties also reveals
that Moscow is unwilling to reveal or confront its true
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threat perceptions and instead blames Washington for
its failure to take Russian interests into account.
Much evidence also suggests that various political
forces in Russia, particularly in the military community,
are urging withdrawal from those treaties, not least
because of NATO enlargement towards the CIS and
U.S. foreign and military policy in those areas. In March
2005 Sergei Ivanov raised the question of withdrawal
142
from the INF Treaty with the Pentagon.
More
recently, Ivanov has stated that the INF treaty was a
mistake.143 And since then Baluyevsky followed suit,
threatening to pull out of the treaty unless Washington
ceased its missile defense plans.144
Indeed, withdrawal from the INF treaty makes no
sense unless one believes that Russia is genuinely—
and more importantly—imminently threatened by
NATO, or Iran and China, but most of all by U.S.
superior conventional military power, and cannot
meet or deter that threat except by returning to the
classic Cold War strategy of holding Europe hostage
to nuclear attack to deter Washington and NATO.
Similarly with regard to China and Iran, absent a
missile defense, the only applicable strategy would be
to use nuclear weapons to deter them, but this means
admitting that these supposed partners of Russia
actually constitute a growing threat to it. Since it is by
no means clear that Russia can or should reply to any
such threat by producing intermediate range ballistic
missiles (IRBMs), the desire to leave the INF treaty
and reactivate missile production of IRBMs represents
only the interests of the defense and defense industrial
sectors, not necessarily Russia’s state interest.
As part of this debate, General Vladimir Vasilenko
also raised the issue of withdrawal from the treaty
after Ivanov did so in 2005, though it is difficult to see
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what Russia gains from withdrawal from that treaty.
Vasilenko, anticipating Baluyevsky, also stated that
the nature and composition of any future U.S./NATO
missile defense would determine the nature and
number of future Russian missile forces and systems
even though admittedly any such missile defense
systems could only defend against a few missiles at a
time. Therefore,
Russia should give priority to high-survivable mobile
ground and naval missile systems when planning the
development of the force in the near and far future. . . .
The quality of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia will
have to be significantly improved in terms of adding to
their capability of penetrating [missile defense] barriers
and increasing the survivability of combat elements and
enhancing the properties of surveillance and control sys146
tems.

Obviously such advocacy represents a transparent
demand for new, vast, and unaffordable military
programs, similar to the demand for reactivating
production of IRBMs regardless of consequences. But
in that case, Russia’s government and military, are, as
Sokov suggested, thereby postulating an inherent EastWest enmity that is only partially and incompletely
buttressed by mutual deterrence.147 That posture makes
no sense in today’s strategic climate, especially when
virtually every Russian military leader repeatedly
proclaims, as did Baluyevsky through 2006, that no
plan for war with NATO is under consideration, and
that the main threat to Russia is terrorism, not NATO
148
and not America. At the same time, that posture
also is an open sign to Beijing and Tehran of Russian
suspicions concerning their ambitions and capabilities.
Still, Russian generals do not raise these issues unless
told to do so.
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Thus it would appear, as it does to Secretary Gates,
that the real threat is the rise of neighboring states’ short
and medium-range missile capabilities, e.g., Iran and
China.149 This is a fine irony inasmuch as Russia was
instrumental in providing the wherewithal for these
states’ military development. If Moscow withdrew from
the INF treaty, that would allow NATO to station INF
missiles in the Baltic and Poland as well as lead China
and Iran to step up their production of intermediate
range missiles as well. Furthermore, it is by no means
clear that Moscow could regenerate production for
both intermediate and ICBMs as their plant for such
production systematically misses production goals.
Thus withdrawal from the treaty could actually
further diminish Russian security, not enhance it.150
Yet Moscow dare not admit that the enemy of America
is also its enemy lest its domestically based foreign and
defense policy that postulates partnership with China
and Iran be seen to be inherently contradictory and
even dangerous.
Russia’s Evolving Threat Assessment.
Under the circumstances, we should not be surprised that Putin’s and Ivanov’s recent threat assessments suggest that Washington and NATO or their
policies are becoming a growing if not the main threat.151
Similarly, every account of Russia’s forthcoming new
defense doctrine similarly suggests that America and
NATO are the main enemies and threats to Russia.152
Putin’s remarks to the Federal Assembly in his annual
speech on May 10, 2006, presaged his remarks in
Munich and merit extensive citation for they indicate
the evolving threat assessment, on the basis of which
he likely has given his defense and foreign policy team
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new strategic guidance towards postulating the source
of threats to Russia and its interests.
Putin began this speech by stating that, as has been
the case since 2001, the terrorist threat is the main one,
but he then seamlessly linked it to what he perceives
as a defining characteristic of much American foreign
policy, i.e., the notion stated above that key American
elites want to keep Russia tied down and weak.
The terrorist threat remains very real. Local conflicts
remain a fertile breeding ground for terrorists, a source
of their arms and a field upon which they can test their
strength in practice. These conflicts often arise on ethnic grounds, often with inter-religious conflict thrown
in, which is artificially fomented and manipulated by
extremists of all shades. I know that there are those out
there who would like to see Russia become so mired in
these problems that it will not be able to resolve its own
problems and achieve full development.153

Putin then invoked the threat of nuclear proliferation,
particularly to terrorists. Thus,
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction also
represents a serious danger. If these weapons were to
fall into the hands of terrorists, and they pursue this aim,
the consequences would be simply disastrous. I stress
that we unambiguously support strengthening the nonproliferation regime, without any exceptions, on the
basis of international law. We know that strong-arm
methods rarely achieve the desired result and that their
consequences can even be more terrible than the original
threat.154

He then went on to berate Washington for abandoning
arms control and raising the threat of using nuclear
weapons against Russia:
I would like to raise another important issue today. Dis47

armament was an important part of international politics
for decades. Our country made an immense contribution
to maintaining strategic stability in the world. But with
the acute threat of international terrorism now on everyone’s minds the key disarmament issues are all but off
the international agenda, and yet it is too early to speak
of an end to the arms race. What’s more, the arms race
has entered a new spiral today with the achievement
of new levels of technology that raise the danger of the
emergence of a whole arsenal of so-called destabilizing
weapons. There are still no clear guarantees that weapons, including nuclear weapons, will not be deployed in
outer space. There is the potential threat of the creation
and proliferation of small capacity nuclear charges. Furthermore, the media and expert circles are already discussing plans to use intercontinental ballistic missiles to
carry non-nuclear warheads. The launch of such a missile could provoke an inappropriate response from one
of the nuclear powers, could provoke a full-scale counterattack using strategic nuclear forces.155

Finally, he concluded his threat assessment with an
attack on the anti-Russian thrust of American foreign
policy:
And, meanwhile, far from everyone in the world has
abandoned the old bloc mentality and the prejudices inherited from the era of global confrontation despite the
great changes that have taken place. This is also a great
hindrance in working together to find suitable responses
to the common problems we face.156

This kind of threat assessment has several
critical consequences. First, it closely resembles the
assessment published by the Chinese government in
its White Papers of 2004 and 2006 on Defense.157 Thus
the shared perception of both the location and nature
of the common threats they face helps cement an antiAmerican Russo-Chinese alliance on a host of issues in
the contemporary agenda of world politics. Second, the
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results of this growing sense of threat from the West
have not only restored the need for Russia to rearm with
both conventional and nuclear weapons, they have all
but undone the hopes for Russo-NATO cooperation
after 9/11. As of 2003, the General Staff made clear
its opposition to joint Russian-NATO exercises
allegedly on the grounds of NATO enlargement and
158
the improvement of missiles. At the same time,
both Ivanov and Baluyevsky made clear that if NATO
remained a military organization, this could force
Russia to make changes in its overall military doctrine
and nuclear policies.159 Baluyevsky went even farther
by stating that “If the anti-terrorist direction of NATO
continues, the threshold for using nuclear weapons
will become lower and this will require a change of the
principle for military planning of the Russian armed
forces, including a change of military strategy.”160
Since the military had already stated in 1999 that
circumstances (among them NATO’s Kosovo operation) had led Russia to argue for lowering the threshold for nuclear use and broaden the circumstances
under which tactical nuclear weapons might be used
against purely conventional attacks, such remarks
must be taken quite seriously.161 In fact, the military’s
enmity to NATO is not due to its policies but rather
to the fact of its existence. As the Ministry of Defense
stated in the so called Ivanov doctrine or White Paper
of October, 2003,
Russia . . . expects NATO member states to put a complete end to direct and indirect elements of its anti-Russian policy, both from military planning and from the
political declarations of NATO member states.… Should
NATO remain a military alliance with its current offensive military doctrine, a fundamental reassessment
of Russia’s military planning and arms procurement is
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needed, including a change in Russia’s nuclear strategy.162

Therefore, it is not surprising that first Moscow
has tried, and recently with some success, to interest
Washington in negotiating what would in effect be
a START III treaty to reduce nuclear weapons on
both sides.163 Neither should we be surprised that
Putin and his subordinates see a deteriorating threat
situation that is drawing ever closer to Russia. Putin,
in his speech to the Foreign Ministry on June 27, 2006,
emphasized the increasingly threatening nature of the
international system, the unilateral American use of
force and supposedly indiscriminate attacks on Islam,
and the possibility of proliferation as major threats
coming closer to Russia. Thus he said that,
We need to be fully aware that, despite all our efforts,
the potential for conflict in the world continues to grow.
After the collapse of the bi-polar world order there exists
a lot of unpredictability in global development. Perhaps
this is why we continue to hear talk of an unavoidable
conflict of civilizations that could become a long-term
confrontation on the lines of the Cold War. I am convinced that we have reached a point today where the
entire global security architecture is indeed undergoing
modernization, and you have probably noticed this for
yourselves. If we let old views and approaches continue
to hold sway, the world will be doomed to further futile confrontation. We need to reverse these dangerous
trends and this requires new ideas and approaches. Russia does not want confrontation of any kind. And we will
not take part in any kind of “holy alliance.” . . . I must
say, too, that the causes fuelling the desire of a number
of countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction and
carry out other military programs include not just national ambitions but also the overblown importance given to force in international relations that is being foisted
on us all. In this respect, the stagnation we see today in
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the area of disarmament is of particular concern. Russia
is not responsible for this situation. We support renewed
dialogue on the main disarmament issues. Above all, we
propose to our American partners that we launch negotiations to replace the START Treaty, which expires in
2009.164

Again, Lavrov echoed this position.165
Arms Control and European Security.
These strategic military issues extend as well into
the conventional sphere and have direct impact on
European security. We have already discussed the INF
treaty above. The foundation stones of European and
Eurasian security are the series of treaties beginning
with the Helsinki treaty of 1975, its extension at Moscow
in 1991, the 1987 Washington INF Treaty, the 1990 CFE
Treaty, extended in 1999, the Paris and Rome treaties
between NATO and Russia in 1997 and 2002, and the
START and SORT treaties from 1991-2002. However,
as noted above, some, if not all, of these treaties are
apparently at risk.
Apart from Russian ambivalence about the INF
treaty, we see the same thing happening with regard
to the CFE treaty. Even before Putin suspended it and
Baluyevsky warned that it might collapse, Ivanov and
his subordinates said that Russia might withdraw
from the CFE Treaty or that it might die a natural
166
death. Russia has claimed that the Baltic States’
failure to ratify this treaty makes the Baltic a “gray
zone” from which potential threats to Russian security
could come even though they also admit that NATO’s
167
token forces there hardly represent a current threat.
Russia has also raised the question as to whether the
projected American restructuring of its basing posture
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in Europe, moving its forces to new bases in Romania
and Bulgaria, violates the CFE treaty as well as the
1997 NATO-Russia agreement on the terms of NATO
168
expansion.
The West’s reply is first that these new U.S. bases
do not violate either of those accords:
The Russia-NATO pact forbids the development of
new bases in the territories of newly absorbed NATO
members. However, the pact has no stipulations concerning the possibility of improving and expanding
the existing military bases and infrastructures of new
members, which is what the Pentagon is proposing to
do. Additionally, the Pact limits the stationing of large
military forces in new member countries, but Washington intends only to preposition equipment and rotate
brigade-strength units (3,000 to 5,000 troops) through
the bases. The planned basing of light forces, rather than
heavy armor, also strengthens the Pentagon’s argument
that it is operating within the bounds of the CFE, which
imposes limitations only on the amount of heavy military hardware and armor a state may possess. Therefore
Washington has strong grounds to argue that its rebasing proposals are within the bounds of the established
treaty framework.169

In addition, Western officials argue that at the
Istanbul 1999 OSCE conference they stated that the
Baltic States would ratify this treaty when Russia
withdraws its forces from Moldova and Georgia as
it promised to do then. Russia has since then refused
either to withdraw the forces from Moldova or accept
that it had any legal or political obligation to do so. Thus
a standoff ensued. Recently, thanks partly to Western
pressure, Russia agreed with Georgia that it would
withdraw from its bases there by 2008. But meanwhile
it refuses to leave Moldova. Indeed, it seeks a 20-year
lease on a base there to perpetuate its intervention on
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behalf of a separatist and visibly criminalized Russian
170
faction across the Dniester River. Russian officials also
talk of launching political gambits to formalize Russia’s
incorporation of Georgia’s breakaway province South
Ossetia into Russia.
These actions not only violate Russia’s 1999
agreement, putting the lie to claims that Russia has no
juridical obligation to leave Moldova and Georgia, they
also would shatter the basis of European security as
outlined in the aforementioned treaties. Incorporation
of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, or Transnistria by force
not only invokes Soviet and Tsarist precedents, those
actions violate the Helsinki and Moscow treaties and
the Istanbul accords, and shatter the post-Cold War
accords with NATO. Like Moscow’s 2004 and 2006
intervention in Ukrainian elections, such actions
betray Russia’s continuing inability to accept the end
of empire in Eurasia even though a Russian empire
there inherently threatens Eurasian and even Russian
security.
The efforts to withdraw from the INF and CFE
treaties are also connected to Russian fears that Western
military-political pressure will be used to consolidate
post-Soviet states’ membership in NATO and/or the
EU or to compel democratizing reforms in Russia or
elsewhere in the CIS where Moscow supports the
reigning authoritarians. Since Russia cannot compete
militarily with the United States, let alone NATO, it
has openly discussed using its strategic and/or tactical
(or so-called nonstrategic) nuclear weapons in a first
strike mode in the event of a threat by either of those
171
parties against it or its interests in the CIS. And Sergei
Ivanov wrote in 2006 that Russia regards threats to the
constitutional order of CIS regimes as the main threat
172
to its security. But it is hard to see how “the threat of
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democracy” or even of revolution in a CIS state is easily
amenable to military reprisals from Moscow other than
the use of Russian forces in a power projection and
counterinsurgency mode. Even so, Moscow has tried
to assert its unilateral security umbrella over the CIS.
Indeed, it long ago gratuitously extended its nuclear
umbrella to the CIS.
Accordingly, Russian military planners envision all
kinds of potential military scenarios in Eurasia due to
NATO’s enlargement that would force Russia to rearm
or retaliate, if necessary with nuclear weapons. For
example, in July 2005 Konstantin Sivkov of the General
Staff’s Center of Military Strategic Studies stated that,
The Alliance has achieved strategic depth of operations
in Russia. U.S. tactical aircraft operating from NATO airfields may now reach Moscow, Tula, Kursk, and other
cities of Central European Russia. This is an important
factor from a geostrategic point of view. . . . It means that
there are no more strategic barriers between Russia and
NATO. What may it lead to? It may lead to escalation of
border disputes with NATO countries (say because of
certain territorial claims, or problems with oil production at sea, and fishing matters) into armed conflicts.
Dangers of this sort exist in the Baltic region (Estonia
claims the Pyatlov District of the Pskov Region) and in
North Europe. . . . the situation is such that a local conflict may promptly become international. When it happens, it will be the alliance as such or the United States
that will be putting forth demands, not the initiator of
the conflict. Weapons may be used if Russia refuses to
173
make concessions—space weapons first and foremost.

Alternatively, informational weapons that were
once thought of as science fiction weapons but are
174
now usable might be deployed. In any case, Russia
must be prepared for what its sees as the threats to
overturn the constitutional order in CIS states as its
biggest threat and those efforts, pace Sivkov, could
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then escalate. Not surprisingly, Ivanov demands full
transparency from NATO about its actions and plans
and raised the issue (or had his subordinates raise the
176
issue) of withdrawal for these arms control treaties.
Contingency planning for these kinds of threats could
only truly be taken to its logical culmination if Moscow
frees itself from these two treaties that are pillars of
arms control and security in Europe, and renounces its
interest in European security.
However, such an outcome reignites an arms race in
Europe and around the CIS that, as Putin and Company
know, Russia cannot afford and which is in nobody’s
interest.177 Ironically, Russia actually depends for its
security on the restraints imposed by those treaties
upon NATO’s members including Washington.
Moreover, it depends on them for subsidies like those
through the Nunn-Lugar Act or Comprehensive
Threat Reduction program to gain control over its
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons arsenals.
Without that funding, the recent visible regeneration
of the Russian armed forces would have been greatly
impeded because at least some of those funds would
have had to go to maintain or destroy decaying
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Russia also
needs Western, and especially American help against
terrorism emanating from Afghanistan, or Iranian and
North Korean nuclearization, and is still interested,
as recent agreements show, in curtailing those states
178
or terrorists’ access to these materials. Therefore
these efforts to withdraw from the relevant treaties are
quite misguided even though Moscow’s legal right to
withdraw from a treaty is not at issue. But if Moscow
persists in these gambits to weaken, eviscerate, or even
leave these treaties, what does that signify concerning
its goals and what then is the future of European and
Eurasian security?
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Therefore, an appropriate American response
should be to maintain the validity of both the CFE and
INF treaties, insist upon fulfillment of the former, and
state U.S. willingness to reaffirm or extend the latter
which is supposed to expire in 2009. Nobody, least of
all Russia, benefits from a new arms race in a Europe
that should be a model of security practices, not a case
of a model gone bad. And Russia’s announced desire
to renegotiate the START I Treaty that is to expire in
2009 was rightly taken up as a new opportunity for
further reducing the likelihood of nuclear weapons use
or threats to use them among the two leading nuclear
179
states.
Still, despite the agreement to renegotiate nuclear
arms reductions, there appears to be a fundamental
difference in approach to these negotiations between
Moscow and Washington. Hitherto the Bush
administration has evaded getting into a negotiation,
claiming it does not want to return to the Cold War
relationship where both sides’ nuclear arsenals were the
defining factor in their relationship. In other words, the
Bush administration is still chasing the will of the wisp
of strategic unilateralism in nuclear matters.180 Even if it
has accepted in principle the idea of negotiating a new
arms control treaty, it is likely to adhere as far as possible
to its previous thinking on verification and arms control
treaties, including thinking of Russia more as a partner
than as a nuclear enemy. Lavrov’s approach, cited
above, shows that while the administration is and has
been prepared to move beyond deterrence with regard
to Russia, Moscow cannot move beyond its inherited
anti-Western strategic paradigm that sees America as
the main enemy. Therefore it can only contemplate
a deterrence relationship with Washington which
inherently, protestations of friendship aside, is based
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on Schmitt’s concept of the presupposition of enemies.
Thus unilateralism on one side encounters a posture
grounded in that presupposition on the other that
remains frozen in a hostile and deterrence posture. The
results should not have been difficult to foresee.
Meanwhile, Russia’s posture on other arms control
treaties like the INF treaty, is no less dangerous.
However, Washington’s perceived quest for ever more
credible options for deterrence, dissuasion, and even
nuclear warfighting scenarios only stimulates everyone
else’s insecurities and desire to achieve their own means
of deterring or dissuading America.181 Doing so would
also further stimulate the trend toward greater reliance
on nuclear weapons as warfighting instruments that
have been in effect at least since 2000, and also possibly
enhance the attractiveness of such weapons to wouldbe proliferators.182
To say this however, is not to abandon the need
to put pressure on Russia to fulfill the treaties it has
signed whether they deal with nuclear arms control or
conventional weapons and Eurasian security. Indeed,
such a strategy is all the more necessary for our policy
toward Russia because just as we seek to achieve our
immediate defense and security goals by advocating
democratization and the rule of law—albeit by chasing
rhetorical abstractions or theological categories
of good and evil and regime change vis-à-vis Iran
and North Korea—so must we do so with regard to
Russia. But we must not do so on the grounds that
are commonly asserted, i.e., theological and liberal
political universalism as interpreted by the particular
administration in power at any given time. Rather,
whatever our private beliefs might be about the
justification for such pressure for reform, in political
terms it is only sustainable on the grounds that the
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treaties to which Russia is party explicitly invoke
these values and processes and thus represent Russia’s
solemn commitments as well as the constitutional
foundation of our present world order from which
183
Moscow as well as Washington benefit. Abandoning
those treaties therefore undermines world order
and directly counters both American and Russian
interests.
The Domestic Basis of Estrangement.
This increasing mutual estrangement grows out of
both American and Russian domestic trends. Certainly
the rhetoric, posture, policies, and activities of the
Bush administration and of its domestic coalition,
or the spokesmen thereof, reinforce long-standing
Russian and other perceptions of a rogue American
power unfettered by concern or respect for its interests
or international institutions, and threatening both the
integrity and the vital foundations of the Russian state,
i.e., its pretensions to great power status. Similarly
America’s unilateral invasion of Iraq clearly and
conclusively convinced many Russian policymakers
that partnership with Washington led nowhere and
that America was itself a kind of rogue elephant in
international politics that had to be restrained by
countervailing power.184
More recently there is an increasing belief that efforts
to be America’s partner are inherently unavailing
because of America’s fixed hostile position and that,
in any case, America is in decline as Lavrov has now
repeatedly stated.185 The mounting Russian perception
of increased military threats from America and NATO
also plays no small role in this litany of grievances
against Washington and the West.
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While there is obviously no lack of foreign or
domestic criticism of the Bush administration’s policies
or reasons for engaging in that practice, it is equally
obvious that the administration now is hamstrung and
isolated, largely due to Iraq and its repercussions. The
outcome of a policy aiming to leave Washington with
a free hand to act as it pleases in world affairs is that
its hands are full, while its energies and legitimacy
are depleted. This condition applies to U.S. policy in
dealing either with North Korea, Iran, the Middle East
in general, or, for that matter, Russia.
But the same relationship between domestic
and foreign policy whereby the former profoundly
conditions the latter in America holds true for Russian
policy as well. Russian foreign policy grows out of the
need to validate or legitimate both a revived autocracy
and the accompanying neo-imperial pretext for it, and
the mystique attached to the latter. Psychologically, it
evidently is imperative for the Russian elite not only to
believe that Russia is always a great power regardless
of the actual reality, but apparently to internalize
the belief of Soviet leaders dating back at least to
Lenin that all world politics revolve around Russia
and its trajectory.186 Therefore foreign observers like
Hryhoriy Nemyria, Director of the Kiev based Center
for European and International Studies, has accurately
stated that, “A significant part of Putin’s legitimacy lies
in his ability to control developments in Russia’s near
187
abroad.” The continuing existence of this and other
associated convictions discussed below, is inextricably
connected to the fact that the structure of the Russian
state increasingly resembles that of late Tsarism with
188
some Soviet or contemporary innovations.
As Russian succession struggles illustrate, the
recurrence of corruption, subversion, and force
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deployed against internal “enemies” is among the
most important indicators that Russia’s elite refuses
to be bound by or account to any system of laws or
of legal-political institutions.189 Western diplomats,
including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, have
publicly expressed concern that Putin observe the
terms of the constitution and not succeed himself in
2008.190 This kind of injunction need not be directed at
a truly self-confident and legitimate state. In Russia,
autocracy logically entails empire, an autarchic and
patrimonial concept of a Russian state that is owned
by the Tsar, controlled by his servitors, and which can
191
only survive by expansion. Therefore Nemyria’s
observations are perfectly consonant with the internal
192
logic of the regime. Similarly it is equally noteworthy
that Russia now defines energy security as denoting
its companies’, i.e., the state’s, access to Western firms
while restricting Western access to its own firms. While
Russia’s main weapon is energy, it apparently is toying
with enlarging its territory at Georgia’s expense by
fabricating grounds for annexing Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, if not the Transnistrian Republic that it seized
193
from Moldova.
It logically follows that such a regime will have
difficulty accepting the conventions of international
life, including solemn treaties that it finds burdensome.
Beyond that, just as autocracy means that the autocrat
is not bound by or answerable to any institution or
principle at home, it also means that in foreign policy,
as often happened under the tsars, Russia feels free not
194
to be bound by its own prior treaties and agreements.
As Lilia Shevtsova of the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace in Moscow observes,
It is impossible not to see that Russia’s foreign policy
is the hostage of Russian internal systemic problems.
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Growing authoritarianism, redistribution of property,
attempts to destroy political alternatives—all these elements result in Moscow’s zig-zagging foreign policy.
Quasi-democracy and quasi-market go hand in hand
with Russia’s quasi-partnership with the West. Attempts
to preserve Russia’s traditional system which strives to
look modern, are likely to exhaust political pragmatism
and increase the danger of unpredictability, especially
when Russia discovers that the raw materials potential
is more a weakness, than a source of power. The West,
in turn, will have to decide what its partnership with
Russia really means—an incentive to modernization or
international legitimization of its slide towards traditionalism.195

But this point about the “autocratic” nature of Russian
foreign policy is profoundly true in a more general
sense. German analyst Heinrich Vogel has formulated
this point in a deeper way, namely,
Continuity of the kind [of leadership] described above
also implies increasing volatility as the leadership has
full sway in shifting political priorities in the agenda of
foreign relations. Freed from any substantive balances
or restrictions at home, Russian foreign policy is open in
more than one direction.196

This insight has immediate ramifications in East-West
relations. For example, Vogel also observes that,
The partnership between [the] EU and Russia is shaped
by the perceptions and ambitions of political elites on
both sides who do not see eye to eye. Geopolitical analysts in Russia now even claim a chance to recoup political territory which was lost over the last 10 years. Any
dialogue about a “common strategic vision” will therefore be particularly difficult if the leadership of one side,
unconstrained by institutional balances, is hedging unclear or outright incompatible ideas about the rules of
cooperation and competition in Europe. This is the case
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with Russian policies of “liberal imperialism”: and the
prevailing hegemonial approach of coaching and defending autocratic regimes in Belarus, Moldova, and Central
Asia against any outside criticism. The unconditional
support for antidemocratic practices and trends in Russia’s near abroad dovetails with a distinct trend toward
authoritarian regime justified by the Russian elites of all
political shades as the “Russian way to democracy.”197

Russia and the Policy of the Free Hand.
There can be little doubt that Russia pursues a
policy of the free hand above all. In 2005 Lavrov
announced that Russia refuses to be bound by foreign
198
standards or conform to them. Lavrov also insists
that the West respect Russian interests in the CIS but
makes no reciprocal statement of respect for the treaties
199
Russia has signed and violated. These statements
and actions that comprise the actuality of Russian
foreign policy confirm Trenin’s warnings that Russia
really does not want to belong to a larger institutional
grouping and most of all wants a free hand in world
politics, especially, but not only, in the CIS.
Russian observers fully understand that the demand
for a free hand in world politics, and for a closed antidemocratic bloc in the CIS, is directly traceable to
Russia’s domestic politics. As Dmitry Furman wrote in
2006,
Our system’s democratic camouflage demands partnership with the West. However, the authoritarian, managed content of our system dictates the exact opposite.
A safety zone for our system means a zone of political systems of the same kind of managed democracies
that we are actively supporting in the CIS and, insofar
as our forces allow, everywhere—in Serbia, the Middle
East, even Venezuela. The Soviet Union’s policy might
seem quixotic. Why spend so much money in the name
of “proletarian internationalism”? But if you do not ex62

pand, you contract. The same could be said about our
policy toward Lukashenko’s regime [in Belarus-author].
The system of managed democracy in Russia will perish
if Russia is besieged on all sides by unmanaged democracies. Ultimately it will once again be a matter of survival. The West cannot fail to support the establishment
of systems of the same type as the West’s, which means
expanding its safety zone. We cannot fail to oppose this.
Therefore the struggle inside the CIS countries is beginning to resemble the Russian-Western conflict.200

We should note here the explicit statement that
spread of democracy in and of itself is a mortal
threat to Russia’s rulers. Hence the demand for a
free hand. But the demand for a free hand means
an unconstrained foreign policy based wholly on
power and the interests of the state conceived of in
the most atavistic and unbridled form of realpolitik,
another example of Schmitt’s presupposition of being
encircled by enemies.201 The only limit to the exercise
of that autocratic power, as in tsarist times, is the
conscience of the tsar, and in Putin’s case, that is a
weak reed. Unfortunately, Lavrov and Furman do not
speak for themselves alone. Rather, they articulate a
consolidated elite mentality that sees Russia as an
independent, revisionist, even autarchic actor in world
affairs which merits recognition as a self-sufficient
pole, even empire, in Eurasia. Other analysts too have
discerned the ideational elements of this stance in
the peculiar but deep-rooted conviction that Russia
is a separate civilization, neither wholly Western nor
Eastern, and therefore it merits a special role in Eurasia
as a great power. John Loewenhardt reported in 2000
that despite the fact that this status as a leading pole in
global affairs was then understood to be increasingly
more rhetorical than real,
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In one of our interviews a former member of the Presidential Administration said that the perception of Russia as a great power “is a basic element of the self-perception of high bureaucrats.” If a political leader were to
behave as if Russia was no longer a great power, there
would be “a deeply rooted emotional reaction in the
population.”202

Six years of Putin’s invigoration of authoritarianism
and of Russia’s imperial mystique have inevitably
strengthened those tendencies, making them even
more prominent in officialdom’s mentality and selfreinforcing public propaganda.203 And this ideologicalpolitical reinforcement has also created the basis for the
perception of a perpetual Western or at least American
ideological and domestic threat to Russia’s integrity
and form of government which are inextricably linked
204
in both the elite and popular mind. Since Russia
still cannot accept its reduced status, its militarypolitical elite still harbors unwarranted and unjustified
assessments of Russia’s status in world affairs and
equally unjustified demands for tangible benefits. For
example, a 2005 article in the General Staff journal,
Military Thought, says that, “Russia’s geopolitical
situation enables it not only to effectively develop
its own national economy but also to form a kind of
geoeconomic region comprising the world’s largest
205
nations—Japan, China, India, and other countries.”
This concept also insists that none of the other
former Soviet republics are genuinely capable of being
206
self-standing truly independent states.
Certainly
numerous statements by Russian ambassadors to former Soviet satellites or CIS governments conclusively
show that they do not really accept the full sovereignty
and independence of the states to which they are
accredited.207
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Logically, then, any bloc including those states
is a strategic as well as ideological threat to Russia
and a stalking horse for NATO and the EU and their
208
supposedly openly anti-Russian policy. The threat is
not just to Russia’s great power and imperial ambitions,
but to its existence not only as autocracy but even as
a state. Hence the flourishing of democratic states on
its frontier is a constant threat to the survival of the
state in the only form that its servitors can recognize
it, i.e., an autocracy. This is one reason why Russian
policymakers have evinced such panic and hysteria
(not too strong a set of words) when confronted
by “color revolutions” which they cannot believe
originated in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan due
to their internal political developments. Hence much
of Russian foreign policy has been directed toward
preventing such revolutions, e.g., Russian intervention
in Ukraine’s 2004 presidential election and its policies
toward Belarus and Georgia.209
The idea that these states on Russia’s border or in
its vicinity might choose NATO and the EU of their
own volition or feel genuinely threatened by Russia’s
heavy-handed and unsubtle policies is never even
considered. Not surprisingly, Russian spokesmen decry
the formation of any such blocs and state that without
Russia they will inevitably fail. Alternatively, they
look forward to the reunification of the former Soviet
210
republics of the CIS under Moscow’s auspices.
But what they always insist upon, i.e., their bottom
line, is a unique and superior status for Russia above
any kind of international political constraint. Thus
Sergei Ivanov, Chizhov, and Yastrzhembskiy have
publicly stated that Russia is economically, politically,
and militarily self-sufficient and therefore really does
211
not need partners. Chizhov, speaking about Europe,
argued further that,
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Russia has full rights and counts on participation in European affairs as an equal partner. It should not be isolated from the remaining part of the continent by new
dividing lines and should not be the object of “civilizing
influence” on the part of other countries or their unions
but should be equal among equals.212

Similarly, in 2002 the publisher Vitaly Tretiakov
wrote an article for the journal of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs where he stated that,
We want to be regarded and treated as an ally of the West
in all spheres, including export of energy and, probably,
in the production of armaments. Otherwise, relations
will follow a different pattern. This should apply to the
security sphere. We also expect to be treated as equals in
the sphere of economy and in cases of extending aid to
us in the way this is done among allies.213

In other words, treat us as equals or we will make
endless trouble for you, while at the same time we insist
upon a free hand for ourselves. Not surprisingly, this
kind of policy amounts to extortion, or in other words
to a protection racket. Close examination of much of
Russian foreign policy reveals that such blackmail or
intimidation tactics feature prominently in Russia’s
diplomacy toward both the weaker states of the CIS
and toward Europe and the United States.
However, great power status cannot be conferred
exclusively by virtue of unilateral assertion or by the
threat of raising a ruckus if your demands go unheeded.
To be recognized as a great or superpower—and many
Russian analysts and political figures now argue that
Russia is an energy superpower—a state must be able
to project its power effectively into neighboring regions
to create a legitimate and/or durable order and be
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recognized as such by its interlocutors. Inasmuch as
all projections of power abroad are “injections” into
the world order and efforts to reshape it, we can see
the fundamentally revisionist thrust of Russia’s project
from its activities in the near abroad or efforts to
bully European states with regard to energy.214 It also
habitually uses the energy revenues accruing to it to buy
politicians and subvert regimes in its neighborhood.215
Russia’s attitude of imperial unilateralism might
be a “post-imperial” mentality rather than an imperial
216
one as Trenin argues. But this attitude’s practical
implications as seen in ongoing demands for bases
throughout the CIS; obstruction in CIS frozen conflicts;
and the energy crises with Ukraine, Georgia, and
Belarus in 2006-07, are unmistakably imperial in
consequence and reflect a belief that Russia is an
empire sufficient unto itself and thus above all of
the other rules of international life; precisely what it
217
attacks Washington for doing. Certainly, Russian
scholars know full well that Russia’s elites have long
continued to see the Russian state in imperial terms.
As Alexei Malashenko observed in 2000, Russia’s
war in Chechnya is logical only if Russia continues
218
to regard itself as an empire. More recently Russian
political scientist Egor Kholmogorov has observed that
“‘Empire’ is the main category of any strategic political
analysis in the Russian language. Whenever we start
to ponder a full-scale, long-term construction of the
Russian state, we begin to think of empire and in terms
219
of empire. Russians are inherently imperialists.”
If Russia is such an empire, then it becomes clear
why EU or NATO membership becomes a threat to
Russian sovereignty. For as Deputy Foreign Minister
Ivan Ivanov stated in 1999,
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Our country is not in need of affiliation with the EU.
This would entail loss of its unique Euro-Asian specifics,
the role of the center of attraction of the re-integration
of the CIS, independence in foreign economic and defense policies, and complete restructuring (once more)
of all Russian statehood based on the requirements of
the European Union. Finally great powers (and it is too
soon to abandon calling ourselves such) do not dissolve
in international unions—they create them around them220
selves.

Not only does he here anticipate Trenin’s
observations about a solar system around Russia,
Ivanov also listed as a reason for not joining the EU
the idea that empire preceded independence. Here
he also implied or suggested the deeply rooted belief
among Russian elites that if Russia is not an empire,
it is not a state. But the quest for great power and
empire is the fetish invoked by Russian statesman
throughout the ages to ward off the nightmare of
being marginalized and no longer being a great
power. This nightmare haunts the imagination of
Russia’s political elites and undoubtedly is one of the
most primordial psychological and cognitive drivers
of Russian foreign policy, even if it postulates only
two possible outcomes for Russia—great or even
221
superpower status, or oblivion and marginalization.
Indeed, in pursuing this mirage of being a great power
which can act unconstrained in world affairs, Putin has
sought to copy the Bush administration’s doctrine of
preemption or preventive war to justify its unlimited
right to military intervention in the CIS with rather less
justification than did President Bush, for there have
222
been no foreign based attacks upon Russia.
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TOWARD AN AMERICAN RESPONSE:
OVERCOMING WESTERN INTERNAL
DIVISIONS
Notwithstanding these problems with Russia, it
must be engaged, not ignored. Given the preoccupation
with Iraq, it is by no means clear if our political class
is paying sufficient attention to Russia. That the
U.S. Government keeps being surprised by Putin
is also a sign of insufficient attention to Russian
issues or understanding of what is involved in them.
Nevertheless as a recent study from the Congressional
Research Office (CRO) observed,
Yet developments in Russia are still important to the
United States. Russia remains a nuclear superpower. It
will play a major role in determining the national security environment in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
Russia has an important role in the future of arms control, nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
and the fight against terrorism. Such issues as the war
on terrorism, the future of NATO, and the U.S. role in
the world will all be affected by developments in Russia. Also, although Russia’s economy is distressed, it is
recovering and potentially an important trading partner.223

Similar statements were also presented above, e.g.,
Slocombe’s testimony in 1995 and the observations
by Andrew Michta of the Marshall Center concerning
regional security.224 It should be noted that this balanced
account by the CRO does not imply, as do many other
statements on why Russia is important, that America’s
need for Russian support on these issues outweighs
Russia’s need for American support on these and
many other issues. An essential requirement in getting
Russia right, therefore, is a balance between what both
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sides need from the other and can reasonably expect of
the other side.
For this reason, a policy that merely lectures Russia
without credible counteractions to offensive (in both
senses of the word) Russian policies or actions that
advance American interests has no value. If U.S. policy
is to advance towards the goals of defending U.S.
security and then promoting a better world order, it
must take account of the powers that be, not those that
ought to be in a perfect world. Thus a credible Russia
policy must aim to overcome these defects in Russian
policy, but to do so, it must begin (but not end) by
realizing where Russia currently is and sees itself.225
Even bearing this admonition in mind, an intelligent
policy towards Russia cannot let Moscow’s objections
deter American actions in support of the national
interest where those objections undermine our ability
to reach those interests. This should be the case even
though we might have to pay a higher price for doing so.
But intelligent policymaking towards Russia requires a
fine judgment of what interests can or must be secured,
at what costs, and finally unremitting attention to that
end. It requires a deeper assessment of Russian realities
and trends than the habitual American tendency (that
began long before this administration) of indulging in
the idea that personal relationships with the Russian
leader are either substitutes for or the purpose of U.S.
policy towards Moscow.
Acknowledging Russian realities does not mean
giving Moscow a veto on our policies or overlooking
the intrinsicly self-seeking and opportunistic nature of
the Russian regime that is structurally, not personally,
determined. There are few “imagined” misdeeds in the
record of the Putin government for which it is being
attacked abroad. The Putin’s regime’s record is all too

70

transparent in that regard. Rather, there are all too
many real deeds that deserve consistent international
censure. Instead, acknowledging Russian realities
means that our calculation of interest and of the costs
we can pay to reach them must be better than has
hitherto been the case because on all too many issues,
particularly those connected with the regression from
democratization, we have given Russia a pass.
Thus a sound American policy must also mean that
Moscow must be made to acknowledge other realities
besides its own self-interest. We must realize, and
do so despite the critics at home, that Moscow needs
American support far more than Washington needs
its support. Second, to the degree that U.S. power is
limited by other states’ interests, so must Russian power
be limited accordingly. U.S. policy must see to it that
Russia does not get a free hand to act as it pleases in
world affairs or be allowed simply to make trouble so
that its status or importance will then grow. Accepting
Russia’s demands for a free hand, either actively or
tacitly, or giving it a free hand, especially in the CIS,
only leads to greater autocratic behavior at home and
belligerence abroad. For example, precisely because
it seeks a free hand in Eurasia and was not countered
by effective action, it is now threatening to leave the
CFE treaty and thus be free to do what it wants with
its armed forces in Eurasia, thereby achieving a unique
status among every other signatory of that treaty.
While Russia cannot be ignored in American
policymaking on the issues listed above, its negative
impact can and should be countered and reduced. This
applies equally to Russia’s domestic policies. Indeed,
the strategy outlined below aims at integrating Russia
over time into the Eurasian constitutional and political
order and treaties that it has signed which govern both
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domestic and foreign policy practices. In other words,
our strategy must aim at integrating Russia into a world
order that it has voluntarily accepted, and gradually
eroding the possibilities for it to realize a free hand
abroad. To the extent that we succeed in doing so,
Russian governments will also then not be able to act
with a totally free hand at home. Rather, they will be
bound by the treaties and conventions to which they
are a party. Over time, only that kind of policy will
work to counter the authoritarian impulses that are so
deeply rooted in Russian politics and culture. It must
be realized that this is a patient, long-term policy, not
one that seeks immediate gratification or is motivated
by evangelical and theological beliefs about the
superiority of democracy masquerading as certainties.
And it also means that U.S. policies must be governed
and thus restrained by the same constitutional order
whose validity we seek to uphold and extend.
To achieve those goals, however, we must first dispel
several myths and obstacles that obstruct coherent U.S.
and Western policymaking and then take appropriate
policy actions. The first obstacle is the widely accepted
myth that we or the West as a whole have little or
no leverage upon Russian policy and therefore must
226
adjust to it or tolerate it silently. This, of course, is a
highly self-serving tactic when stated by Russians who
love to insist that the United States or the West cannot
sway their policies, and that foreign motives towards
Russia are invariably hostile and self-serving. Or else
they argue that such criticism is pushing to a return
227
of the Cold War. In the West, this precept amounts
to a self-denying ordnance that paralyzes efforts to
advance Western political objectives when it has the
stronger hand in every dimension of international
power. Moreover, obtaining such a condition of
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Western paralysis or admission of defeat is actually the
goal of all of the bad behavior displayed by Moscow
in the hope that foreigners will assume nothing can be
done. Therefore, the Russian media is all too happy to
report frequently that the West “accepts” the nature of
228
Russia’s “special democracy.” Indeed, at one point
Lavrov even asserted that after a Putin-Bush summit
meeting in 2004 “no concern was sounded” about the
229
lack of democracy in Russia by the American side.
But when uttered in the West, this observation
represents a bizarre failure of applied political
intelligence. We need not argue that American or
Western power is unlimited or that its authority,
legitimacy, and virtue are absolute—neither of which
proposition is true—to realize that the strongest power
in the world and the strongest alliance in the world do
not lack the resources with which to influence Russian
policy and that Russia has frequently adjusted to meet
firm American policies. After all, George Kennan’s
containment strategy was just such a strategy that
sought to compel an eventual “mellowing” of Soviet
domestic and foreign behavior by applying political and
other external pressures abroad. Similarly, the judicious
application of the total weight of the instruments of
power available to the West in world politics would
surely frustrate or at least blunt the imperial drive and
the restoration of autocracy that underlies so much
of today’s Russian foreign policy and force domestic
changes as a result. As Vogel writes,
This logic of “mutually assured dependency” (the political dimension of interdependence) implies a world of
rational choices. In this world, the structural deficiencies
of the Russian economy and its integration and interdependence with the international community restrict
Moscow’s ability to be uncooperative or engage in spoil230
sport behavior in international crisis management.
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Arguing that we have no leverage is not only bizarrely
misguided but also reduces the Western pursuit of a
viable Russian policy to incoherence.
But beyond realizing that we have leverage
and the right, if not the duty, to use it, both on our
own and in tandem with our allies, to advance our
interests, we need to overcome the second obstacle to
a sound Russia policy. Namely, we must devise and
implement a coherent strategy, first of all within our
own government, and then together with our allies in
order to deploy that leverage to its most efficacious
use. This strategy must be implemented in regard to
key issues: Iran; the Middle East; the Western presence
in the CIS; the sanctity of treaties signed by Russia;
energy; arms control; and Korea; to name only a few.
Doing so requires, first, that we overcome the fact that
on numerous key issues, including apparently policies
toward Russia, and in regard to at least some of these
aforementioned issues, our policy process has been and
is still broken. Any attentive reader of the newspapers
can quickly discern that there exist major divisions
among the players in Washington that inhibit unified
231
and coherent policy formulation and implementation.
Until and unless we can overcome those problems, any
approaches to our European and other allies regarding
these issues will be compromised from the start. Of
course, the EU has to overcome its own incoherence
and internal divisions, but lectures from Washington
on that particular subject can only go so far. The EU’s
members themselves have to come to a consensus on
what they see as their future demands upon Russia
and Russia’s role in Eurasia for their own sake, not just
ours. And it is now very clear to the EU that it must
achieve its own internal consensus vis-à-vis its Russian
agenda.232
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There is no doubt that divisions within the topmost
echelons of the U.S. policy process exist on whether or
not to press Russia systematically on the issues of dispute
233
in our common agenda, not least democratization.
Second, U.S. policy toward Russia as it is now carried
out suffers from several shortcomings that obstruct
realization either of strategic or democratic aims.
The first problem is the false dichotomy that has
existed among many commentators and in many
administrations, including this one, that in order to
achieve strategic goals, e.g., Iranian or North Korean
nonproliferation, we have to soft pedal or even sacrifice
democracy promotion, or vice versa. It is very clear that
the current administration has opted for a relationship
with Moscow that emphasizes strategic goals over
democratization, for all its ringing invocation of
234
universal democratic values. And the results are
hardly worth the neglect of Russian democratic issues
or the effort invested in achieving coordination with
Russia at the expense of those democratic issues. In
fact, Michael McFaul’s assessment of U.S. democracy
promotion policy towards Russia even calls it
“anemic.”235
But aligned to that false dichotomy between
promoting security objectives and democracy are
procedural errors that impede realizing both strategic
and democratic goals. As Dov Lynch of the European
Union’s Institute for Security Studies observes,
U.S. policy toward Russia has been heavily presidential.
This has meant that only decisions agreed at the highest
level were recognized as being important by Moscow.
This did allow the White House to “use” Secretary Powell—in the words of one U.S. official—as a “bad cop” on
a number of occasions in 2004, but it did not always provide for the best result. As developments inside Russia
and in Russian foreign policy became more worrying,
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the U.S. administration faced the difficulty of seeking to
revise the policy in some areas while maintaining others, all the while avoiding the image of a radical shift
in relations. The appointment of Condoleezza Rice as
Secretary of State in 2005 led to a discreet reassessment
of U.S. policy. The priorities remain firm on counterproliferation and nonproliferation. However, the spread of
democracy in Russia’s neighborhood has risen to the
forefront, and the Administration has become more vocal in expressing its concerns about democracy and the
rule of law inside Russia. Still, U.S. policy remains largely strategically-driven and its thrust is still minimalist in
terms of seeking Russia’s transformation. Russia matters
for the United States less for itself and more in terms of
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how it can affect U.S. interests in other policy areas.

Lynch’s assessment subsumes within it as well the
unwarranted emphasis on a personal relationship with
Putin. As a result of the policy described by Lynch on
both sides, there is little governmental implementation
of agreements or progress on issues while the
relationship stays focused on personalities rather than
programs. This fact, unfortunately extends a wellestablished tradition, but also makes it harder for the
Russian government to reform itself or ensure policy
coordination and fulfillment when it does concur with
the United States.
Therefore it is essential that the Bush administration,
or failing that, its successor, undertake policy actions
that will compel both our government and the Russian
government to interact with each other on the basis of
ongoing and constant mutual dialogue. Specifically,
the administration or its successor should propose
the recreation of a contemporary analogue of the
Gore-Chernomyrdin commission that operated under
President Clinton. As former Ambassador to Russia
James Collins observes, doing so would obligate senior
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officials across a wide range of bureaucracies (not just
the Pentagon and State Departments) to carry out
serious projects that needed to be done. Second, this
commission did and could again empower different
ministry-department relationships that would force
both the Russian and American bureaucracies to deal
with each other on an intimate and permanent basis
with a view to achieving real and constructive results.237
By having such a permanent structure in place, both
governments would have to talk to each other more
often, more frankly, across many venues, and at a
lower level that could actually achieve positive actions.
Otherwise we will have the same kind of bureaucratic
drift that has characterized both sides’ policies for too
long and in the American case helped contribute to the
flaws in our policy that are outlined above.
A third case in which our policy toward Russia is
in error is the absence of any sign of a truly coherent
energy policy designed to reduce our or our allies’
dependence upon Russian supplies and potential
blackmail. As Putin has gone on one successful
offensive after another in 2006-07 to lock up Eurasian
energy reserves and access, the EU has been divided,
timorous, and incoherent, and Washington has always
been too late in replying or in fashioning attractive
counteroptions for interested parties. And while the
EU wants to negotiate a deal with Moscow formalizing
the bilateral energy relationship with Russia while it
simultaneously seeks other sources of energy, it is very
unclear if not unlikely that Moscow can currently be
forced to accept its own agreements or refrain from
trying to penetrate European economies and thus
governments as it has sought to do throughout Eastern
238
Europe and the CIS. Certainly Moscow has made it
abundantly clear that it will not accept the EU’s energy
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charter anytime soon. Since energy is Moscow’s
main weapon in its current foreign policy, this absence
of a strategy or of a policy puts us and our allies at
a grievous political disadvantage and also makes it
more difficult to help CIS members who are being
blackmailed in various ways by Russia on this point or
being threatened by Russia with unrelieved economic
warfare and even Cold War.
This point is particularly urgent when we realize
that due to the collapse of the Orange Revolution,
Ukraine is approaching either a state of ungovernability
or of enduring political stalemate which could allow
Moscow to manipulate both the energy card and all the
other resources of which its disposes in the Ukraine to
destabilize that region or obstruct its democratization
and Westernization. This also means that Ukraine’s
energy situation is one that at present makes it
240
perpetually vulnerable. Belarus too succumbed in
early 2007 to Russian pressure and is now frantically
seeking to diversify its sources. Other CIS states
escaped this threat only because Iran or Azerbaijan
provided them with energy.
Energy security is not just a question of supplying
Europe or Asia, or from Russia’s standpoint of ensuring
its ability to meet foreign and domestic demand at a fair
market price. Rather, it entails the basic security and
opportunity for progress of the former Soviet states
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whether in Ukraine or in Central Asia. While it is in
these states’ interests, and Russia’s, that their energy
relationships be marketized rather than subsidized,
there is little doubt that Moscow’s policies have been
aimed at political results first, and Russia still charges
differential prices to its customers in line with its
political prerogatives.
Fourth, there are major divisions within the
administration on how to deal with major proliferation
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issues like Korea which have led us to outsource our
Northeast Asian policy to Beijing, which, in turn, allied
increasingly with Moscow, aims to supplant American
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influence there, if not elsewhere. Fifth, on Iran, it is
unclear how far we are prepared to go to stop Iranian
proliferation, and it certainly is even more unclear
how far our European allies will go toward the same
objective. Indeed, numerous commentators and the
former Foreign Minister of Great Britain Jack Straw
have said that European participation in a war with
Iran over its nuclear threat is “inconceivable.” But it
is quite likely that without the threat of robust action,
Iran will not acceded to demands to stop enrichment
or its overall military nuclear program. Nor does
the European response to the Lebanon crisis suggest
any interest in playing a truly robust role in bringing
peace to the Middle East either in part or in whole by
disarming Hezbollah which is using Russian weapons
supplied by Iran and Syria who bought them from
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Moscow.
Certainly it is clear from the crisis generated by
Hezbollah’s unprovoked attacks on Israel in July 2006
that Moscow is not prepared to restrain Iran or its
proxies. Indeed, even though the Foreign Ministers
negotiating with Iran were finally driven by Tehran’s
dilatory tactics to agree to bring its nuclear program to
the Security Council with a threat of sanctions, Lavrov
has firmly and consistently opposed any effort to
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impose sanctions on Russia’s arms trade with Iran.
In addition, there have been leaks suggesting that
despite tough rhetoric our officials inwardly accept the
fact that at the end of the day, Iran will have a usable
245
nuclear weapon. While much of this is due to the
consequences of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, it also is the
case that both Moscow and Beijing resolutely oppose
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doing anything that will injure Iranian interests or
apparently impel Tehran (or Pyongyang, too) to stop
building nuclear weapons even if they now recognize
that Iran’s nuclear program has military purposes that
can threaten them.246 If anything, they have aided Iran’s,
Pakistan’s, and North Korea’s quest for nuclear energy
and for conventional weapons, including missiles, and
deterrence capabilities against the United States.247
Finally, there are major divisions within the
administration even now on how to proceed to deal
with the challenges facing us in Central Asia which
are posed by both domestic conditions favoring
dictatorship and foreign threats, not the least of which
is the Russo-Chinese alliance against reform, and to
suppress the foreign policy independence of those
248
states. Furthermore, due to our own dilatoriness and
overextension, Russia is gaining the upper hand in its
efforts to marginalize American influence there, too.249
Until and unless those and other such differences
among policymakers are overcome, no coherent Russian policy is possible, let alone imaginable. But overcoming our own internal divisions on these issues is only
the beginning of wisdom. For any approach to Russia
to succeed, it must not be merely a unilateral one, but
rather one shared by and with our European allies on
the basis of genuine consultation and consensus. And
it must be attuned to both Russia’s domestic and its
foreign policy behavior which are mutually reinforcing.
Despite unity with the EU on Iran to date, it is by no
means clear if the Transatlantic Alliance has achieved
a truly significant recovery since the invasion of Iraq in
2003 which shattered both the Transatlantic Alliance
and any hope of a unified European common foreign
and security policy. Thus after having edited another
volume in the seemingly endless series of publications
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examining the troubled Transatlantic Alliance, Marcin
Zaborowski concludes that,
It is clear that the greater congruence of policies between
both sides of the Atlantic was not followed by the convergence of principles and ideologies. Most importantly,
the EU and the United States continue to have fundamentally different views on the role and importance of
international institutions and agreements. The legacy of
this disagreement is not just ideological, but it affects
transatlantic cooperation in some specific policy fields,
most prominent in the Middle East.250

These same observations may be invoked
concerning Western policy toward Russia for even
where assessments of Russian developments converge,
policy recommendations and outcomes currently
diverge. Even if there is a unified American position,
if it is not coordinated with and implemented by our
European allies and Japan in the Far East, it will fail to
register with full force in Moscow whether it is about
human rights, the frozen conflicts in the CIS, Central
Asia, or energy. So beyond the reestablishment of our
own internal policy coherence, there must be close
coordination and a united course of action with our
allies regarding an agenda of East-West negotiation.
As Lynch writes,
Transatlantic coordination is crucial for ensuring that
Russia remains a positive player on the world stage, an
inclusive player in its neighborhood, and a state led by
the rule of law. Whether the agenda is thick or thin, internal developments cannot be divorced for long from
external behavior. What happens inside Russia impacts
on the nature of Russia as a partner for the EU and the
US. At a time when Europe and America have less leverage over Russia’s domestic development than they had,
transatlantic cooperation becomes all the more vital. In
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this the EU and US should build on areas of overlap in
their agendas, such as regional security questions in the
Balkans and the Middle East, ensuring positive momentum in the former Soviet Union, and raising concerns
with domestic developments in Russia.251

This also means that on occasion Washington will
have to defer to the collective wisdom of its partners
and even to China and Russia’s arguments. But it also
means that the United States needs to stimulate NATO
and the EU to do better than they have in coming
up with coherent policies towards Russia as regards
Ukraine, Moldova, the Caucasus, energy issues, Central
Asia, and democratization; for today the prevailing
trend is towards incoherence and disunity within both
organizations on these agenda issues.252
Strengthening Nonproliferation.
It should now be clear that we cannot achieve our
basic and primary strategic aim of strengthening the
nonproliferation regime by tying Iranian and North
Korean nonproliferation to externally imposed regime
change or the threat of it by unilateral American
military action. Our power and understanding of what
needs to be done over both the short and long term in
such cases are both limited thanks to our experience
in Iraq. Moreover any such efforts, in the absence of
forceful provocation by those or other states, will enjoy
no support anywhere, further overtaxing the resource
base for American power and limiting our capacity to
preside over any kind of security order in the relevant
region.
If our fundamental objective is nonproliferation,
our resources should be focused on achieving that goal
since the effort to link it to coerced regime change in
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Northeast Asia or the Gulf enjoys no support by the
other negotiators and cannot be reached by any means
available to the United States now or anytime soon.
Objectionable as these regimes are, we have neither
the means nor the legitimate international authority to
change them by force, nor the wisdom to know how to
achieve a legitimate order in these areas afterward by
unilateral action.
Furthermore, by decoupling this demand from our
demands for nonproliferation, we actually gain more
flexibility to send a robust message to Iran, Syria, and
North Korea should they then proliferate because they
no longer have even the semblance of a justification for
their position. Even if the invasion of Iraq may have
given them a supposed justification for proliferation
and sponsorship of terrorism, the fact that they will
subsequently be held to account on the basis of existing
international agreements to which they are parties to
desist from proliferation and sponsorship of terrorism
creates a sufficient justification for the use of pressure
or the threat of force and releases us from the position
of making threats that cannot currently be carried out.
If we can change the international behavior of these
regimes, by political means preferably but by force if
absolutely necessary, then their current foreign and
domestic policy behavior will gradually be rendered
increasingly dysfunctional, forcing change upon them
from within, not from outside. To the extent that they
cannot then mobilize domestic or foreign support
against the Bush administration, they will be compelled
by force of circumstances and superior Western power
to adjust their behavior over time. Admittedly, this is a
slow process, but Iraq shows what happens when we
seek instant , forceful, and externally imposed regime
change. That lesson should induce behavior change in
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Washington first before we seek to persuade other key
interlocutors of the soundness of our position.
Therefore, to effectuate change within Russia and
other challenging states, we must change the external
environment within which they operate by engaging
them politically. This engagement also includes
holding Russia to account for treaties and conventions
that it has violated. Indeed, careful examination will
show that there is no other realistic alternative. Despite
all the inherent traps and snares in a dialogue between
Pyongyang and Washington or between Tehran and
Washington, we cannot compel their denuclearization
by our refusal to talk to them; quite the opposite.
Here we cannot hide behind multilateralism because
all our partners except possibly Japan have urged
Washington to engage in precisely such a dialogue
with North Korea. Avoiding such dialogues and
clinging to ringing but empty rhetorical positions only
deepens our internal divisions and disputes with our
negotiating partners and allies while failing to achieve
denuclearization. If anything, the threat of coerced
regime change powerfully accelerates these countries’
nuclear programs which enjoy tacit or covert support
from Moscow and Beijing precisely because they
are joined in rejecting any further unilateralism by
Washington, a position in which they are joined by
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both South Korea and our European allies. While it
would be satisfying to punish these states, e.g., Iran
for its actions in provoking a war in Lebanon, our
capabilities are circumscribed and limited.
Consequently we need a strategy that will force
these proliferators to change their behavior over
time by mitigating their and our security dilemmas
and rendering their current behavior even more
dysfunctional than is presently the case until it is no
longer feasible to carry it out. Furthermore, such an
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engagement will work over time to dissolve the bonds
linking China, Russia, and in the Korean case, South
Korea because neither Moscow, nor Pyongyang, nor
Seoul wants China to be the deciding voice in Northeast
Asia, whatever their criticisms of Washington. But
that is where our obstinacy is driving us with regard
to the Korean peninsula where Beijing rather than
Washington will become the arbiter of that peninsula’s
destiny. Endless statements from Beijing and Moscow
reiterate the identity of these states’ views about Korea
and much else because we have done everything
possible to drive them together. For example, with
regard to Korea, we see the Russian and Chinese
governments’ oft proclaimed identity of interests and
254
proposals.
Indeed, Russian scholars now state that Russia
works with China to coordinate their proposals
in the Korean nuclear negotiations and numerous
communiqués cite an “identity” of views on this
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topic. Removing many of the reasons for their shared
positions regarding either North Korea or Iran helps
erode their unified position in these and other issues.
As experts have argued that a working Russo-Chinese
alliance is the greatest security threat we could face, a
negotiating strategy designed to uncouple these two
potential rivals against us but also against each other,
256
makes perfect sense.
This policy’s wisdom would also be underscored
by the fact that an examination of the historical record
strongly suggests that a precondition for effective
nonproliferation is mutual cooperation between
Moscow and Washington as happened in 1986-96 and
which has since evaporated due to Russian domestic
regression to autocratic rule, American unilateralism,
257
and the perception thereof abroad. Once proliferation
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is uncoupled from regime change, it becomes much
easier to fashion both a strong negotiating coalition
against the former, which is the main threat, and to do
so strictly on the grounds of international security and
international treaties that must be observed. This allows
us and the other treaty signatories to create a different
security environment around proliferators, complete
with binding accords, supervision, and inspections—
an environment that safeguards their internal security
but which contributes to rendering their form of rule
even more dysfunctional than is now the case. But
most importantly, it facilitates the reaching of verifiable
agreements on these states’ nuclear program which is
258
the key point.
Without the ability or rationale to justify threatbased programs, in the absence of a threat these states
must then deal much more urgently with economic
and political questions at home for which they have
no answer and for which their structures are woefully
inadequate, if not illegitimate. And since contemporary
scholarly research suggests that proliferation policies
are the product of various coalitions of domestic interest
groups in these states, a policy that transforms the
playing field on which these coalitions maneuver has
a much greater chance of success than does unilateral
rhetoric which in reality cannot be implemented except
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at ruinous cost. That process, as was the case with
Moscow in 1986-91, will generate a process of change
that will be all the more powerful for being domestically
generated rather than externally coerced.
Arms Control.
The foundation stones of European and Eurasian
security are the series of treaties beginning with the
Helsinki treaty of 1975, its extension at Moscow in
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1991, the 1987 Washington Treaty on Intermediate
Nuclear forces in Europe (INF), the 1990 Paris Treaty
on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), extended in
1999, the Paris and Rome treaties between NATO and
Russia in 1997 and 2002, and the START and SORT
treaties from 1991-2002. However, some, if not all,
of these treaties are apparently at risk. And that risk
has grown with Putin’s announcement that Russia is
suspending its participation in the CFE Treaty for 150
days (even though there is no legal basis for doing so
in the treaty) in July, 2007. It also should be noted that
there were numerous Russian warnings to this effect,
e.g., Sergei Ivanov and his subordinates’ warnings that
Russia might withdraw from the CFE Treaty or that it
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might die a natural death.
Recently, thanks partly to Western pressure, Russia
agreed with Georgia that it would leave its bases there
by 2008. But meanwhile it refuses to leave Moldova.
Indeed, it seeks a 20-year lease on a base there to
perpetuate its intervention on behalf of a separatist
and visibly criminalized Russian faction across the
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Dniester River. Russian officials also talk of launching
political gambits to formalize Russia’s incorporation
of Georgia’s breakaway province South Ossetia into
Russia.
These actions not only violate Russia’s 1999
agreement, putting the lie to claims that Russia has no
juridical obligation to leave Moldova and Georgia, they
also would shatter the basis of European security as
outlined in the aforementioned treaties. Incorporation
of South Ossetia or Abkhazia or Transnistria by force
not only invokes Soviet and tsarist precedents, those
actions violate the Helsinki and Moscow treaties, the
Istanbul accords, and shatter the post-Cold War accords
with NATO. Like Moscow’s 2004 and 2006 intervention
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in Ukrainian elections, such actions betray Russia’s
continuing inability to accept the end of empire in
Eurasia even though a Russian empire there inherently
threatens Eurasian and even Russian security. Russia
also claims that the Baltic States’ failure to ratify the
CFE treaty makes the Baltic a “gray zone” from which
potential threats to Russian security could come even
though they also admit that NATO’s token forces there
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hardly represent a current threat.
The INF treaty, too, is at risk. Clearly the efforts
to withdraw from the INF and CFE treaties are also
connected to Russian fears that Western militarypolitical pressure will be used to consolidate postSoviet states’ membership in NATO and/or the EU,
or to compel democratizing reforms in Russia or
elsewhere in the CIS where Moscow supports the
reigning authoritarians. Since Russia cannot compete
militarily with the United States, let alone NATO, it has
openly discussed using its strategic and/or tactical (or
so-called nonstrategic) nuclear weapons in a first strike
mode in the event of a threat by either of those parties
263
against it or its interests in the CIS. More recently,
Sergei Ivanov has threatened once again to put missiles
into Kaliningrad if NATO does not take up Russian
complaints about these treaties.264 Moscow already did
this in 2001 and created a scandal thereby, indicating
a continuing inclination in at least certain circles to
conduct unilateral and even menacing political and
strategic actions using Russian nuclear weapons.265 For
instance, Moscow long ago gratuitously extended its
nuclear umbrella to the CIS even though none of those
states invited it to do so. But such contingency planning
could only truly be taken to its logical culmination if
Moscow frees itself from these two treaties that are
pillars of arms control and security in Europe and
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renounces its interest in the continuing stabilization of
European security.
However, such an outcome reignites an arms race
in Europe that, as Putin and Company knows, Russia
cannot afford and which is in nobody’s interest.
Ironically, Russia actually depends for its security
on the restraints imposed by those treaties upon
NATO’s members including Washington. Moreover,
it depends on them for subsidies through the NunnLugar Act or Comprehensive Threat Reduction
program to gain control over its nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons arsenals. Without that funding,
it is quite likely that the recent visible regeneration of
the Russian armed forces would have been greatly
impeded because at least some of those funds would
have had to go to maintain or destroy decaying
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Russia also
needs Western, and especially American help against
terrorism emanating from Afghanistan, or Iranian and
North Korean nuclearization and is still interested, as
recent agreements show, in curtailing those states or
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terrorists’ access to these materials. Furthermore, it
is no less at risk from Iranian missiles than anyone else
(except possibly Israel), given the two states’ hidden
rivalry in the Caspian basin. Thus it needs to cooperate
with the West on proliferation concerns, too. Therefore
these efforts to withdraw from the relevant treaties
are quite misguided insofar as Russia’s real interests
are concerned even though Moscow’s legal right to
withdraw from a treaty is obvious. But if Moscow
persists in these gambits to weaken, eviscerate, or even
leave these treaties, what does that signify concerning
its goals and what then is the future of European and
Eurasian security?
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Therefore, an appropriate American response
should be to maintain the validity of both the CFE and
INF treaties, insist upon fulfillment of the former, and
state U.S. willingness to reaffirm or extend the latter
which is supposed to expire in 2008. Nobody benefits
from a new arms race in Europe which should be a
model of security practices, not a case of a model gone
bad. And Russia’s announced desire to renegotiate the
START I Treaty that is to expire in 2009 should similarly
provide an new opportunity for further reducing the
likelihood and perceived value of nuclear weapons use
or threats to use them among the two leading nuclear
267
states. Doing so would also reverse the trend toward
greater reliance on nuclear weapons as warfighting
instruments that has been in effect at least since 2000,
and also possibly reduce the attractiveness of such
weapons to would-be proliferators.
To say this, however, is not to abandon the need
to put pressure on Russia to fulfill the treaties it has
signed whether they deal with nuclear arms control or
conventional weapons and Eurasian security. Indeed,
such a strategy is all the more necessary for our policy
toward Russia because just as we seek to achieve our
immediate defense and security goals by invoking
rhetorical abstractions of democratization vis-à-vis
Iran and North Korea, so must we do so with regard
to Russia where there is a legal justification, based on
solemn international treaties, for doing so. Whatever
our private beliefs might be about the justification for
such pressure, in political terms it is only sustainable
on the grounds that the treaties to which Russia is party
explicitly invoke these values and processes and thus
represent the constitutional foundation of our present
268
world order.
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Democratization.
Putin and his clique, including Lavrov, regularly
charge that demands for democratization are purely
politically motivated and neo-colonialist in their rhetoric and an attack on Russia’s system of governance, in269
deed an attempt to change it. Actually they are partly
right. Such attacks do represent an attack on Russian
governance because that governance is increasingly at
variance with solemn international accords that Russia
freely signed and to which it must be held. Just as the
United States resents attacks on conduct at Guantanamo or at Abu Ghraib but is nonetheless compelled to
redress those situations through legal and democratic
pressure and processes, so too is Russia subject to
the same international constraints and standards that
it freely accepted. However, it is clear that Moscow
would prefer a relationship with the United States like
that among realpolitikers in the 19th century, i.e., no
discussions of democracy and rather a concentration
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on concrete bilateral interests. For example, Lavrov
protested the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
complaints about democratic deficits in Russia. He
charged that this was not part of the Council’s remit
and duplicated the work of organizations like the
OSCE which Russia, not by accident, also seeks to
deflect from making such complaints as part of its
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remit. At the same time, the demand for an end to
these attacks and this kind of defense by Putin et al.
reflects both Moscow’s demand for a free hand and its
endless status insecurity or anxiety.
Indeed, the demand for an end to such attacks along
with the assertion that America seeks to undermine all
the other CIS governments as well as Russia had become
a staple of Russian foreign policy argumentation even
before Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in late 2004.
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Already in July 2004, Russian commentator M. Chernov
wrote:
The American Administration is beginning a campaign
to topple the regime of Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan. . . .
By all appearances Washington has decided to get rid of
Karimov, relying on the successful experience of revolution in Georgia and using elements of the “Kosovo scenario,” establishing control over the territory by creating
“managed conflicts” in the Uzbek provinces [primarily
in the Fergana valley] and bringing in peacekeeping
272
force.

The exact parallel of this so-called American
strategy to Russian strategy in Georgia and Moldova
is testimony, as psychologists have long observed, that
the projection onto “the other” is a hallmark of paranoia,
the latter being a long-established tradition in Russian
politics, not least where foreign influence in the CIS is
concerned. Not to be undone, two other commentators,
Yevgeny Myachin and Aleksandr’ Sobyanin, argued
as well that Washington and European governments
pursue a strategy of managed conflicts using terrorism
to achieve their aims. Thus Sobyanin argued that the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) located in
Afghanistan and Pakistan “works in close cooperation
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with Western intelligence services.”
The persistence of such neo-Soviet tactics and
mentalities in Russian public discourse underscores the
distance separating Russia from true democratization.
By early 2005, Moscow’s paranoia about the supposed
democracy campaign orchestrated by Washington
had merged with its anxieties about securing for
itself an exclusive primacy in the CIS. The newspaper
Kommersant reported on February 24, 2005, that,
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In response to the U.S. side’s criticisms regarding Russian domestic and foreign policy, the Kremlin, according to Kommersant’s information, has begun preparing
counter-criticisms connected first and foremost with the
growth of the West’s planned activity aimed at replacing the ruling regimes in the CIS. In Moscow they are
convinced that the velvet revolutions which have taken
place or are being prepared are the result of the activity of Western nongovernmental organizations and the
special services, which are nurturing and training opposition forces. In the Kremlin’s opinion, such activity
is particularly dangerous in regard to the countries of
Central Asia where the export of revolution could lead
to serious, long-term destabilization. Nor does Moscow
like the military-political activity of the United States on
CIS territory, in particular the intention to station military bases in Georgia [which has never been the caseauthor] and AWACS south of Kyrgyzstan, and also to
assist in the creation of an association of Central Asian
states (without the participation of Russia, China, and
Iran). [There is no public record of such a proposal as of
this time-author.] In the Kremlin they believe that all this
could be perceived as the implementation of the strategic task of ousting Russia from the post-Soviet area, and
they are suggesting that the United States cooperate in
strengthening the “security zones” around Russia’s borders so as to hinder the proliferation of international terrorism.274

But as long as it is not a democracy and an
international law-breaker, Russia cannot expect to
be acknowledged as a true member of the G-8 or any
democratic club or as a great power, certainly not a great
European power. Neither can it be exempted from what
is now the common practice whereby all governments’
internal policies are subjected to constant foreign
scrutiny. And Russia, based on its record, certainly
cannot be entrusted with an exclusive sphere of interest
around its peripheries based on “security zones” when
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it is a prime fomenter of regional instability. Indeed,
such policies only ensure the ultimate crash of the
present Russian status quo.
Therefore that pressure for democratization must
not only continue, it should grow and be regularly
invoked by American leaders even as they seek to
advance the grounds of human rights and adherence
to democratic norms of conduct precisely because
Russia and other Eurasian governments have signed
all these treaties, going back to the Helsinki treaty of
1975. The cornerstone of our demand for this kind
of policy is the basic building block of world order,
namely the doctrine of Pacta Sunt Servanda (treaties
must be obeyed). And the conditions that gave rise to
those treaties with regard to democratization in Europe
have not been fully overcome as Russian and even
more Belarusian policy illustrate. Like it or not, Russia
or its potential satellites cannot successfully pretend
that they are being confronted with double standards,
or talk about Russia being a sovereign democracy as it
now does. The treaties now in effect clearly outline a
diminution of unbridled sovereignty and arguably any
recognized international treaty does so as well. That
argument should be the cornerstone of our demands to
treaty signatories coupled with meaningful sanctions,
not just economic, for failure to uphold these treaties.
Of course, there are also equally good security or
strategic reasons for upholding democratization at
every turn even as we seek avenues for negotiation.
It is not just because we believe, with considerable
justification, that states which reach democracy are
ultimately stronger, even if they have to cross through
dangerous waters to get there, it also is that, as noted
above, Russia shows no sign of wanting responsibility
for its actions and their consequences, e.g., in the frozen

94

conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, or in Ukraine, let alone
its support for the repressive regimes of Central Asia
or its arms sales abroad. To the extent that violence,
crime, and authoritarian rule flourishes in these states,
they are all at risk of upheaval, even sudden upheaval
as we have seen in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, and
in the repeated manifestations of internal violence that
shook Uzbekistan in 2004-05 and could easily do so
again. Such violence and instability could easily spread
to Russia as the example of Chechnya and the North
Caucasus suggests.
Not pushing for reform even as we seek these
states’ security from attack by terrorists or from their
incorporation in a Russian sphere of influence avails us
little. For, as Tesmur Basilia, Special Assistant to former
Georgian President Edvard Shevarnadze for economic
issues, wrote, in many CIS countries, e.g., Georgia and
Ukraine, “the acute issue of choosing between alignment
with Russia and the West is associated with the choice
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between two models of social development.” Indeed,
even some Russian analysts acknowledge the accuracy
of this insight. Thus Dmitry Furman writes that, “The
Russia-West struggle in the CIS is a struggle between
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two irreconcilable systems.” Indeed Furman even
accepts the repressiveness of the current regime, saying
that “Managed democracies are actually a soft variant
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of the Soviet system.”
The aptness of these observations transcends
Georgia and Ukraine to embrace the entire postSoviet region, since it is clear that Moscow opposes
“exporting democracy” to it. Indeed, it regards the
idea with contempt and thus attracts the local dictators
who cleave to it for support against Western pressures
278
for democratization. Basilia also pointed to the local
perception of Russia as security threat.
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Nowadays there are many in the West who believe
that Russia has changed—and, having reformed, seeks
to interact with neighboring countries in conformity
with international norms. Some Eurasian countries
would disagree with this opinion, and believe instead
that the Russian mentality has not changed much, and
that Russia continues to deem the “near abroad” as its
sphere of social influence. After the second war with
Chechnya, many think that Russia regards violence
as its major tool for resolving social and political
problems, especially with regard to non-Russian
peoples from the former empire. Thus integration into
the international community should be viewed as a
279
guarantee for security and further development.
The current silence or relative silence on democratic
issues facilities the exportation of Russia’s sphere
of influence and style of rule throughout the CIS,
while strengthening Georgian, Ukrainian, and other
democracies not only forestalls chances for internal
upheaval in those states, it also rebuffs Russian
imperialism and thus helps strengthen domestic
Russian calls for reform. More urgently it reduces
Russia’s chances to engineer long-standing reversals of
both Westernization and democratization in Ukraine
and elsewhere, outcomes that only reduce security
throughout the CIS.
The logic is the same as George Kennan’s even if
containment is not the policy choice here. By standing
on the basis of international law and the democratic
choice of those states’ peoples, not our own unilateral
and hegemonic power, and by working intensively
with those states which wish the benefits of association
with the West, we can create examples of progress that
will resonate in Russia and elsewhere while checking
the spread of deformations of governance that only add
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to Russia’s and our own insecurity. NATO was and is
correct in observing that its and the EU’s expansions
enlarge the domain of security in Europe and Eurasia
to the benefit of Russia if not that of its elite which can
only survive by imperialism and predation.
Ultimately then the tenacious, insistent, and
unceasing proclamation by Russia of deviations
from its own promised course of action are legally
and strategically strongly founded and mutually
invigorating. A strategy that engages not only Russia
on its vital issues and agenda, but also the CIS on an
equal basis with Russia and does so while unceasingly
proclaiming that democratic values enshrined in treaties
must be upheld, benefits everyone except Russia’s
rulers. But it certainly redounds to the benefit of the long280
suffering Russian people. Neither does it represent an
effort to overthrow Russia unless one wants to accept
at face value the self-serving pronunciamentos of the
ruling group. What must be understood as a guiding
strategic principle here is that Russian autocracy and
its corollary, Russian imperialism, are the gravest
security threats facing Eurasia (including Europe and
Russia itself) and are ultimately incompatible with any
progress of the Russian people, or Eurasia, to security,
liberty, and prosperity.
Precisely because such a state constitutes a standing
invitation to uncontrolled military adventurism—of
which there has been much in Russia’s brief history
and not least due to the absence of democratic control
281
over the power ministries—it has to be checked.
There is no contradiction between engaging Russia
on the great issues of proliferation and arms control,
and cooperating with it against the common enemy
of terrorism, while at the same time insisting on its
behaving according to European norms that it has
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accepted in the treaties it has signed, all with a view
to integrating it with its European neighbors. While
this is certainly difficult in practice, it is hardly less
difficult than the policy we now are conducting which
has left us attacked by unending crises with few if any
governments willing to help us.
In fact, a policy that bases itself on treaties and
laws rather than upon unilateral assertions of power
is actually more effective than that alternative even if
it means narrowing the scope of freedom of action for
282
unilateral American ventures. As Robert Wright’s
recent argument for reforming U.S. foreign policy in
general towards what he calls progressive realism
contends,
There is principle here that goes beyond arms control:
the national interest can be served by constraints on
American behavior when they constrain other nations
as well. This logic covers the spectrum of international
governance, from global warming, (we’ll cut carbon dioxide emissions if you will) to war (we’ll refrain from it
if you will).283

Indeed, democratization is essential, first of all in
regard to Russia’s power agencies. The armed forces
still regard NATO and the United States as their main
enemies and their exercises confirm it, even to the point
of often involving missile and nuclear strikes or largescale conventional exercises against alleged terrorists.
Second, although Putin and Ivanov have endeavored
to restructure at least some of the armed forces to fight
primarily against terrorist attacks, which are the current
main threats to Russian security, this use of the military
in a counterterrorist or counterintelligence force can
have the most serious negative domestic outcomes
as we have seen in Chechnya. Moreover, these forces

98

could also easily be used, as Gorbachev and Yeltsin
had sought to use them, i.e., against democratic reform
284
at home.
Third, the tendency to adventurism that led
Moscow into its so called peacemaking operations in
the Caucasus and Moldova have now embroiled it in
situations where the threat of war, particularly with
Georgia, is constant and where Russian policy seems
mainly to consist of provocations of Tbilisi in order
to get it to launch a violent conflict, or of responses
285
to Tbilisi’s own penchant for provocative acts.
So dangerous a policy inevitably has unforeseen
consequences. The recent signs of military adventurism,
buzzing Scotland, flights to Guam, the resumption of
long-range air patrols, and submarine races to plant
the flag of sovereignty in the Arctic, only serve the
armed forces’ myopic interest of “walking tall.” They
do nothing to enhance Russian security. And, finally,
the lack of democratic control over the armed forces
has been a constant and lethal aspect of Russian policy
toward Chechnya which has resulted in frightful
violations of human rights and which has generated
in response a running series of low-intensity conflicts
across the North Caucasus for which Moscow has no
solution.
While democracy is not a panacea, it is safe to say
that a democratically controlled military would have
behaved differently as would its masters also. Indeed,
it is arguable that what Russia’s military fears most
about NATO expansion is that it generates an external
pressure that is supported by domestic reformers
to democratize the entire range of Russian national
security policy and subject it to civilian and democratic
accountability under law, something that is anathema
286
to that military-political elite. Thus ultimately there
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are compelling geostrategic reasons why the vigorous
and ongoing insistence on reforms as signed in
international treaties is an essential and indispensable
part of any sound Western policy toward Russia.
Energy Policy.
Every day Americans feel the lack of a sound energy
policy. At the same time energy, in Putin’s words, “is
the heart of our economy.” Thus, for Russia, its energy
assets are the equivalent of a political Viagra making it
seem that it is a great power and allowing the state and
its servitors to amass fabulous wealth. Nonetheless,
due to the organization of the Russian economy which
follows the autocratic model of a rent seeking elite
dealing with a rent-granting autocracy, it is very likely
that by 2010, according to Russian analysts, Russia will
be suffering from an energy shortage, in oil, gas, or
287
electricity, if not all of these. This also helps explain
288
Putin’s new nuclear power initiative.
Neither the effort to blackmail Ukraine, the Baltic
states, and Europe, nor Russia’s need to dominate
Central Asian and Caspian producers in order to retain
its political-economic structure, is in America’s interest.
Neither are such policies in the interests of those states
that would be victimized by such Russian policies, other
key consumers like Europe and China, nor ultimately
those of the Russian people who must bear the direct
costs of an inefficient and autocratic petro economy,
that is, in fact, growing more slowly than almost all
the other post-Soviet states. Obviously, here we need
to have a coherent and comprehensive domestic policy
that reorients use of energy to more efficient systems, or
other sources as they become affordable. But we should
not delude ourselves that cheap oil or gas can return any
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time soon. This is due not only to our demand which is
the greatest in the world, or to surging Asian demand,
but also because approximately 80 percent, if not more,
of world oil supplies are state-owned. These states are,
except for Canada, Norway, and Great Britain, all too
prone to use oil as a state weapon and turn into an
economy dependent on energy rents. Cartels, in this
environment, are the rule, not the exception.
Accordingly, Washington must fight fire with fire. It
is already the case that numerous Asian and American
scholars have called for an international energy
association in the belief that such a system would not
only alleviate North Korea’s need for energy which it
uses to justify its nuclear program, but also assist other
Northeast Asian and Pacific states to satisfy their needs
289
as well. Such an organization also, or so they profess
to believe, could lead to a stable structure or security
290
discussions and peace in that region of the world.
Whether or not that is the case remains to be seen.
But it is quite important that China, Japan, South
Korea, and India be integrated into global energy
organizations and that the possibilities for energy
rivalry with China, which fill policymakers here and in
291
Beijing with anxiety be reduced. Certainly one way to
do so is to facilitate the integration of India and China
into the International Energy Agency. Nevertheless,
it clearly is in the geopolitical interests of Washington
and its allies including the members of the International
Energy Agency (IEA) to integrate the largest Asian
consumers and do everything possible to persuade
them of the benefits to them of such integration and of
reliance on the global market compared to the wasteful
and dangerous current practice of exclusive long-term
292
supply deals.
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Another and possibly complementary tactic is to do
everything possible to encourage national oil companies
in other producer states and in consumer states to
293
invest in increasing their productive capacity. Indeed,
the only way to do so is to demonstrate to Russia that
its current method of oil and gas production cannot
satisfy is own domestic needs, let alone the claims of
importers who then remit to Russia valuable foreign
currency. And without such investment at home and
the accompanying transparency that it would generate,
foreign direct investment in Russia’s energy sector
will not materialize, leaving it behind. If we cannot
get the producers’ attention in this fashion, it might be
worthwhile to form the equivalent of a countercartel
or at least a consumers’ association through the IEA
which would be made up of the EU, the United States,
China, Japan, India, and South Korea, and which could
influence the price of oil and/or gas by announcing
that each member of the group a whole is prepared to
buy its entire energy needs, or even a large percentage
of them at a fair market price and auction, making
sellers compete for those contracts. Obviously, to the
294
extent that this is possible it forces prices downward.
Beyond forcing prices downward, this group should
disseminate best technologies and practices among its
members, allowing them to move toward ever greater
efficiencies in energy use and to alternative sources of
technology, particularly cleaner coal use which benefits
the United States and China the most. Inasmuch as
China has long been consciously seeking to reduce the
energy intensity of its economy and per capita energy
consumption, possesses enormous coal reserves, and
is a large investor in alternative energy sources, such a
policy would reduce demand and exercise downward
295
pressures on prices.
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Third, such an organization would reduce the
growing Sino-American tensions in the Gulf and
Middle East which could contribute to an overall
improvement in Sino-American relations and unite
those governments around a compelling common
296
interest. Fourth, inasmuch as Russo-Chinese energy
relations are tense and even rivalrous, if not a case
of both sides seeking to exploit the other, such an
organization would magnify those things that divide
Russia and China while reducing those that divide
297
China and America. And since a new Russo-Chinese
alliance is believed to be the greatest security threat we
could face, this kind of outcome would represent no
298
small achievement.
Fifth, at the same time, such a solution would
allow Russia to sell its oil and gas in Asia by creating
a regularized forum at a fair market price and would
help overcome the obstacles that have held back its
ability to develop this market. If it stops trying to
swindle its partners besides China, i.e., South Korea
and Japan, as it has been doing for the last 3 years, it
might actually get the investment it needs from them
299
in return for a reasonable program of sales to them.
Then Russia would get a fair market price and could
more easily participate in the regeneration of North
Korea as part of any overall solution to its energy
and security problems. Indeed, an energy association
would answer Pyongyang’s needs if it were to become
serious about bargaining over its nuclear program.
And facilitating such a settlement inviting Russia to
become a major contributor to North Korea’s future
energy sources has long been a major objective of the
300
Putin government.
Russian participation under market conditions in
such an arrangement would force reforms in its energy
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industry, and thus its government. Such reforms
might then allow for foreign investment, particularly
in Siberia and its infrastructure, which is essential for
the historical task of reviving Siberia, and rejuvenating
Russia as a reliable Asian power. Russia would play a
recognized role in a framework of security for Northeast
Asia but it would not be able to blackmail its partners
to the West and South because they would be able
to build more pipelines to global markets and not be
compelled to rely only on Russian pipelines. Finally, to
the extent that the energy industry in Russia undergoes
genuine reform and is unable to monopolize its
customers, it will have to change. So, too, will the state;
and hopefully other economic centers of excellence will
arise in Russia, freeing it from its historic dependence
upon a cash crop for export.
This strategy too depends upon transforming
the external environment through creative U.S.
statesmanship in order to effectuate change over time
both in Russia and in the global order. In all cases of
this strategy, whether it be proliferation or energy
issues, the threat of force is existentially present as it
always is, but it need not be invoked or called into play
other than in cases of overwhelming threat. If carried
through successfully, this strategy has the potential, in
ways that force deployed unilaterally does not have,
to bring about desirable changes over time in the
world order on the basis of a shared consensus among
America’s partners operating under our leadership or
in tandem with us.
CONCLUSIONS
We urgently need to rethink many of our policies,
especially as they are linked to one another. To get
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Iran to renounce nuclear weapons, we must deal with
Russia’s plan for becoming a global center for nuclear
301
power and spent fuel. One could easily multiply
such examples. But this very interconnectedness, plus
the fact that the problems Russia poses are essentially
nonmilitary and must not be allowed to reach that stage
where they become military, call for a coordinated
multidimensional strategy using all the instruments of
power across a global backdrop. We cannot impose our
favored form of regime upon Russia nor should we try,
but we cannot passively allow it to flout international
agreements and embark upon a course of autocracy,
empire, and adventurism, that has repeatedly proven
to be ruinous for its people and its neighbors.
Moreover, we cannot be either complacent or
despairing. The oft-cited and even widely accepted
ideas that we have little or no leverage, or its analogue
that we need Moscow more than it needs us, are
302
ridiculous. Unfortunately those notions are tied to a
belief that complex political issues can be solved in the
blink of an eye, not by what Henry Kissinger called
the “patient accumulation of nuance.” Thus, some
fallaciously argue that if we cannot fix the problem
at once by Russia’s capitulation to our pressure, it is
supposedly hopeless to try. Yet it is clear that the agenda
of issues with Russia goes far beyond strict bilateral
U.S.-Russian relations in both geographical scope and
complexity, and requires precisely a combination of
patience and superior insight.
Neither can we yield to the opposing complacency
that other issues are too urgent, or that we can wait for
another time to tackle the Russian agenda, or that we
can simply browbeat Russia because of our superior
power and virtue. Conditions in Eurasia are already
and rapidly becoming ever more crisis-prone. Russian
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analysts admit that Russia remains “a risk factor,” not
303
a reliable or autonomous pole of world politics. The
North Caucasus, as noted above, remains out of control,
with some 250,000 Russian security personnel from the
armed forces and Ministry of Interior, as well as the
304
so-called multiple militaries being stationed there.
Russia’s relations with Georgia could very easily
spill over into active violent conflict over Georgia’s
breakaway province, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia,
and its ties to Moldova are a permanent violation of the
treaties it has signed with the West. In fact, at least some
governments and militaries reject this complacency
even if they defend against their anxieties sotto voce.
Although never voiced publicly by elected European officials, there is concern about Russia. It is rarely
announced as policy, but the force structure of the
Bundeswehr—still, all these years after the end of the
Cold War, organized to defend the homeland against
tanks coming from the east—makes it obvious. In a way
that frustrates and confounds its NATO partners, Germany still de facto prioritizes conventional territorial defense even if it pledges allegiance to the Petersberg tasks
which presume force projection capabilities.305

Moreover, as former Secretary of State Colin Powell
stated, in the current threat environment,
This means we must do something statesmen have been
reluctant to do since the birth of the modern state system. We have to understand and try to influence not just
what states do outside their borders, but in some cases
what goes on inside their borders. This marks a strategic
rebalancing made necessary by circumstances.306 (Italics
in the original.)

Perhaps even more urgently, the current crisis in
Ukraine which has brought the country to the brink
106

of ungovernability, owes much to continuing Russian
subversion and intervention there. If it is allowed to
continue unchecked and the Ukrainian government is
not strengthened to the point of being able to put its
house in order, its democratization and Westernization
processes will be set back for years. That not only
means another quasi or virtual democracy as was the
case before, but also a new satellite for Russia. Here we
should always remember that Russia without Ukraine
cannot threaten the peace of Europe because it is not
an empire, just an aspirant to it. But with a Ukrainian
satellite, Russia will be emboldened to carry further its
efforts to destabilize neighboring regimes in Europe,
only this time they will be NATO and EU members,
Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, the Baltic states, and
especially Poland. Finally, the condition of too many
Central Asian states once their rulers depart the scene
is too perilously close to violence or to failed state
status to be complacent about trends in Central Asia.
All these challenges, if not crises, are critical points in
the East-West relationship because ultimately “The
main reason why the West cannot remain complacent
about Russia’s actions is the fact that Russia’s ‘near
abroad’ is, in many cases, also democratic Europe’s
307
near abroad.”
In other words, time will not wait upon us. To quote
David Ben-Gurion, “time works for us or against us
depending on what we do with it.” Neither will other
states wait passively for us or let us off the hook of
our responsibility, i.e., developing a coherent policy,
the means to carry it out, and harmonizing it with our
allies. Iraq cannot be the only issue in our foreign policy
for it already bids fair to suck up all the oxygen needed
to conduct a global security policy. In any case, neither
Russia, its interlocutors, nor other states or issues will
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let us merely act in an ad hoc tactical fashion with no
thought for long-term consequences or strategy. Like it
or not America, for better or worse, is in Colin Gray’s
308
term “the sheriff” of world order. We, as Lincoln
said, “hold the responsibility and bear the burden.”
Therefore it is incumbent upon us to exercise this
responsibility for and to the world judiciously, but we
cannot let it evaporate due to inattention, fecklessness,
or the lack of a strategic approach to our interests and
those responsibilities.
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